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INTRODUCTION
What follows is an analysis of China's post-1949 policy of
nationalizing foreign firms. 1 The method of research for this
monograph was dictated by the subject matter. The only way to
piece together China's nationalization policy was through access
to various confidential documents of individual foreign firms and
various business organizations in Hong Kong and London and
through interviews of various businessmen and officials, some of
whom were "interested parties" in the nationalization process.
Some of these sources required non-attribution. Since China has
said so little about its nationalization policy, a degree of nonattribution is the price which the author shares with the reader in
order to tell the story at all, a common problem among studies of
nationalization throughout the world. 2
Chapter One sets out the historical context in which the
nationalization policy was formulated. Foreign enterprise acted
both as an agent and benefactor of imperialism in China. When
imperialism was deprived of its previous power and prerogatives
to directly influence the business environment in China, the
profit-making ability of foreign enterprise suffered accordingly.
Chapter Two analyzes the terms of nationalization as they
relate to British firms in China. After World War II and the
Chinese Community victory. neither Great Britain nor British
firms could play a dominant political and economic role in China.
In reaction to these changed conditions, various schemes were
proposed by the firms in an attempt to salvage something from
the imperialist heritage. But with fixed and immovable assets
built up over the years, the firms had very little flexibility. They
could only hope for a modus vivendi, which would now be
determined by the Chinese but might perhaps be acceptable to the
firms as well.
Chapter Three analyzes how the firms had become hostages,
not only to fixed and immovable assets built up over the years, but
also to the new government which was determined that the firms
should repay what China's leaders no doubt believed was a
historic debt to China: The firms became hostages to the Chinese
1
l<'or a study of the nationalization policy as it relates to Chinese capitalism,
Ecklund, "Protracted Expropriation of Private Business in Communist China,"
Paci{ir 4ffairs, Fall 1963, pp. 238-49. Lucien Taire's pro-western diatribe Shanghai
Episoa• 'Hong Kong: Rainbow Press, 1957) has as its only merit the fact that it is
one of the few studies to deal even superficially with foreign direct investment m
China aftet l949.
2 .Jessica Pernitz Einhorn, Exproprzation Politics (Toronto: Lexington
Books l974).
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government's demand that they contmue to operate irrespective of
losses.
Chapter Four describes the terms of closure for the large
British firms. As with any liqutdation, a variety of problems
inevitably arose, reflecting not nnly the problems of normal
business dealings but also problems relating to the different needs
and capacities of the parties involved In the closure process both
parties had different, if somewhat overlapping, interests. China
was steadfast to assure the least disruptive transition possible,
both for the firms' Chinese employees and for the economy as a
whole. The firms were determined to minimize their financial
losses, but in a manner which would not jeopardize the firms'
future trade with China, instead ot m China.
The fifth and final chapter brmgs the essay full circle to
summarize what made China's slow-motion nationalization
possible. State power made legal formalities largely irrelevant. In
a new position of control, the Chinese, like the English before
them, employed their power in their own interests. They
demanded reverse compensation whereby British firms had to
send money into China to gain permission ultimately to hand over
to China what the firms' directors viewed as the firms' own assets.
After several years of trying to resume usual business, the firms
decided to cut their losses - which the Chinese doubtless viewed
as historic retribution - and to concentrate on obtaining as large
a share of China's external trade as possible. Over time a
mutually beneficial relationship was established, to the benefit of
both the firms and China.
The subject of China's current policy toward foreign enterprise, which does permit some foreign direct investment of a
highly restricted nature, is a very recent development. As such a
general assessment of that policy now would be premature.

* I am grateful to many people who have helped me with this study, a
number of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. I would specifically like to
thank, however, Richard Pfeffer and Robert Tucker, both of Johns Hopkins.
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Chapter I
IMPERIALISM AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN CHINA:
AN OVERVIEW
There has been a great debate over the years about the impact
of foreign investment on China's economy. There is very little
debate, however, about the effectiveness with which the Chinese
Communists have made that issue largely an academic one. Upon
winning the Chinese Civil War in 1949, their policy of slow-motion
nationalization, what I have called "hostage capitalism", signaled
the end of a relatively congenial environment for foreign
enterprise. A casual walk in downtown Shanghai, China's largest
city and once the epitome of foreign enterprise in China, is
illustrative. The custom house clock tower once intoned hourly
chimes as does Big Ben in London. Yet in the new communist era
of the 1950's it played the opening bars of "The East is Red." The
former Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank building, with its imperial
gray columns and glaring bronze lions, is now the headquarters of
the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee.
That there was a foreign stranglehold on key sectors of the
"modern" economy, now symbolized by the landmarks of what
was once an international colony, is undeniable. Foreigners
controlled certain northeastern and southwestern railroads, the
principal mines and heavy industry, a part of the textile industry,
the principal urban services and the major share of steam
navigation. The economic effect throughout the country, however,
was limited. As late as 1931, over three-quarters of all foreign
capital invested in China was in Shanghai or Manchuria. And the
treaty ports remained largely separate from most of the rest of the
Chinese economy. "New economic activity in them did proportionately little to stimulate new economic activity elsewhere in the
country," writes a distinguished student of the Chinese economy,
"and its net impact was thus very much less than the total of
investment output might otherwise suggest." 1
This was not for lack of effort. For more than a century,
Western nations and Japan, in the persons of their various
officials, troops, missionaries and businessmen, asserted and tried
to enforce their right to do much as they pleased in a semicolonized China. Foreign enterprise in particular benefited from
1. Rhoads Murphy, The Outsiders (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1977), p. 126.
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its special legal status under extraterritoriality, partial exemptions from Chinese taxation and diplomatic pressure. But the
effect upon China was a negative one - the Chinese state was
weakened, contributing to its inability to provide a leadership role
in modern Chinese society.
In this context, China's vigorous rejection of the treaty ports
seems unsurprising; anti-imperialist sentiment was a growing
reality in modern China. It was a sharp, and in my view deserved,
reaction to the privileged status, the conspicuousness, and of
course, the hauteur of the foreign presence in China. The foreign
officials, troops, missionaries and businessmen were all part of
the same foreign establishment. As such they shared "in the
invasion of China's sovereignty which derogated the autonomy
not only of an abstract policy but also, more critically, the
autonomy of particular and individual Chinese who apprehended
and reacted to the intruding foreign presence." 2

The Goal of Nationalization
In reaction to the de facto power and influence of foreign
enterprise, the Chinese Communists were committed to eliminate
foreign capitalist ownership of industrial and commercial enterprise in China. Yet this goal could only be achieved after political
power was won and consolidated, followed by land reforms,
cooperatives for the production and distribution of goods and,
eventually, collectivization and nationalization.
Political commitments do not become political realities over
night, especially in a variegated China that was both a semicolonial and semi-feudal society. This realization was expressed in
the Chinese Communists' protracted policy after taking political
power: the overthrow of the forces of external imperialism and
internal feudalism, not the elimination of foreign or domestic
capitalism and the abolition of private property. What Mao Tsetung termed the new democratic revolution was to establish the
conditions for both a bourgeois and a socialist revolution.
As a result there was little that was specifically socialist in
the policies pursued by the Chinese Communists in the early years
of the People's Republic (PRC).
As a matter of moving from one revoiution to the other, Mao
understood the necessity of slow-motion nationalization of foreign
direct investment. In 1947 he criticized as "ultra-left" the party
policies of 1930 to 1934 which included the proposal by the
2. Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early
Twentieth Century, (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1976), p. 111.
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Provisional Soviet Government of Kiangsi Province to directly
expel and confiscate foreign economic and political power. 3 By
contrast, Mao stressed that while it was necessary "to do away
with the special privileges of imperialism in China, the revolution
should distinguish between political and economic annihilation." 4
Criticizing the shortsightedness of past thinking on nationalization, Mao stressed that it would be necessary to permit the
existence of a capitalist sector in the economy for an uncertain
period after the victory of revolution. As Mao spelled it out:
In the interest of the whole economy and in the present and
future interest of the working class and the laboring people,
we must not restrict the private capitalist economy too much
or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to exist and develop
within the framework of the economic policy and planning of
the People's Republic. 5
Table 1: Foreign Investments in China by Country 1902-36
(US$ millions; percent in parentheses)
Country
Great Britain
Japan
Russia
United States
France
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Italy
Scandinavia
Others

1902
260.3(
1.0(
246.5(
19.7(
91.1(
164.3(
4.4(
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6(

1931

1914
33.0)
0.1)
31.3)
2.5)
11.6)
20.9)
0.6)

0.0)

787.9 (100.0)

607.5(
219.6(
269.3(
49.3(
171.4 (
263.6 (
22.9(
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.7(

37.7)
13.6)
16.7)
3.1)
10. 7)
16.4)
1.4)

36.7)
35.1)
8.4)
6.1)
5.9)
2.7)
2.7)
0.9)
1.4)
0.1)

1220.8( 35.0)
1394.0( 40.0)
0.0
298.8( 8.6)
234.1 ( 6.7)
148.5( 4.3)
58.4( 1.7)
0.0
72.3( 2.1)
0.0
56.3( 1.6)

1610.3(100.0) ' 3242.5(100.0)

3483.2(100.0)

0.4)

1189.2(
1136.9(
273.2(
196.8(
192.4(
87.0(
89.0(
28.7(
46.4(
2.9(
0.0

1936

Source: For 1902-1931, see Remer, Foreign Investments, Op. Cit., p. 76, and
Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China
184~1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 17.
3. An analysis of this criticism is in 0. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century
China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). I have been unable to locate
this criticism in its original source.
4. Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and our Tasks," Selected Works,
Vol. IV, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), p. 167.
5. Ibid.
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This balanced and cautious policy made good sense. As the
Chinese Communists decisively shifted their attention to urban
areas, with their war-related problems of administrative decay
and structural dislocation, China's new leaders had neither the
experience nor the training necessary to cope with the demands of
an urban, industrial economy. Initially much of the economy had
to be run using existing, conventional methods, often with the
assistance of incum}?ent, non-Communist personnel, including the
foreigners who had come to dominate China's urban economy.s
The Chinese Communists intended to direct as fast as
possible the transition to a state-owned and state-controlled
economy. As part of the transformation process, Mao wrote, "we
must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no
matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers, learning
from them respectfully and conscientiously." 7
A central aspect of this effort was the Chinese Communistdirected policy of nationalizing foreign capitalist enterprise. Over
a period of seven years, from 1949 to 1957, the PRC redefined and,
except for Sino-Soviet Joint Ventures, ended foreign direct
investment in China. By regulating the conditions for the sale of
labor and by completely undercutting a congenial profit-making
environment, the Chinese placed many foreign firms in the "nowin" position of applying for permission to cease operations in
China and to agree to an assets against liabilities formula in
assessing the value of foreign enterprise, all of which made
compensation for foreign losses a practical impossibility.
Hostage capitalism as a nationalization policy involved
almost exclusively British firms. The largest foreign interest in
China until1931, when the Japanese seized Manchuria and began
to invest heavily there, was that of Great Britain, both in absolute
amounts of investment and in relative share (see table). Like the
investment by other countries, British investment consisted
primarily of direct investment, although loans to the Chinese
government were significant as well. The foreign investment of
other countries in China was not of the scope and scale of British
investment. As one authority on foreign investments in China in
the 1930's has observed, "the outstanding fact about the import
and export trade is the existence of a relatively small number of
6. See Christopher Howe, Employment and Economic Growth in Urban
China, 1949-1957, (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), p. 21.
7. Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," (June, 1949), in
Selected Works, Vo. IV, Op. Cit., p. 423.
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great firms who control most of the capital invested." 8 Among the
best examples are the British firms Jardine Matheson and
Company, whose origins antedated the Opium War, and Butterfield and Swire which commenced business in Shanghai in 1867,
the British-American Tobacco Company and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank. These firms have long been synonomous with
foreign enterprise in China. Of course there were other firms as
well.
8. C.F. Remer, Foreign Investment m
Company, 1933), p. 92.

China, (New York: MacMillan

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
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Chapter II
THE HISTORIC TURNABOUT: THE POLITICS OF
HOSTAGE CAPITALISM

A. Foreign Enterprise in a
Revolutionary Era
B. Revolutionary Realities
The rise of the Chinese Communists in 1949 to a position of
uncompromised control in all matters of Chinese life was an
historic turnabout in the interplay between foreign enterprise and
revolutionary nationalism in China. In part, because of the speed
of the Communist takeover, British businessmen initially saw in
the events of spring 1949 only unrelated and divergent events.
Without fully appreciating the dramatic change which had taken
place, they failed to realize that they were no longer a determining
force in promoting and protecting the previous era's profitmaking
environment.
The pre-Communist era in China proved an inadequate guide
for British businessmen in a new era of revolutionary nationalism. Because of the general decline of Britain's worldwide
influence after World War II and the rise to power of the Chinese
Communists, British businessmen in China could only remain
passive until the conditions under which foreign capitalism would
be allowed to operate by the People's Government were made
clear. Many British firms hoped for some modus vivendi which
would allow continued profit-making within China. This was not
possible because of China's domestic policies for economic
development which did not include a longterm role for foreign
direct investment. In addition, the profit-making limitations
directly· related to the Korean War and the UN embargo on China,
which Britain agreed to observe, dampened British anticipation of
continued profits.
A. Foreign Enterprise in a Revolutionary Era

When the Chinese Communists gained control of China's
major coastal cities, British firms were virtually defenseless and
there was no easy withdrawal. With only nominal opposition from
demoralized Nationalist Chinese armies in the spring of 1949, the
major cities of the Yangste Valley came under Chinese Commu-

10

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

nist control in quick succession: Nanking (April 23), Hangchow
(May 3), Wuhan (May 17), and finally Shanghai (May 27) and
other coastal areas. As the communist forces advanced, British
business interests expectedly attempted to protect their investments which the British Chamber of Commerce estimated to be
worth £1,000,000,000 in Shanghai alone. 1 Although it is impossible to precisely calculate all these assets in money terms, the fact
that they were large amounts is not disputed.
Preparing for open battle between Chinese and Nationalist
troops and the likely threat of damage to British investments, the
British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai responded instinctively. The Chamber advocated the "internationalization of
Shanghai" as a way of keeping Shanghai safe from the
"interference" of Chinese armies in the civil war. 2 "Whether or not
there will be fighting is impossible to say," reads a Chamber of
Commerce memorandum to London, "but the declared intention of
the Nationalists is that they will defend to the bitter end." Even if
they did not fight, the Nationalists were thought to be prepared to
strip the city. Some observers thought that they remained in
Shanghai just for that purpose. 3
Since its broad proposal to place an international military
cordon around all of Shanghai was impractical, the Chamber of
Commerce proposed instead a more restricted approach which still
was beyond Western capabilities. 4 The Chamber proposed a joint
armed intervention by the British, American and French
governments to encircle the Biind, the Western financial enclave
along the Whampoa River. This military scheme was reasoned as
practical since the protective force needed for such an operation
would not be large, and once the imminent conflict had subsided
the protective intervention of Western troops could then be
discontinued.
1. John Kes~ck, Chairman, British Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai) to
British Consul-General, Shanghai, December 11, 1948, in China Association
Minutes and Circulars (C.A.M.C.), 1949. The China Association has traditionally
been a powerful London-based lobby for British firms doing business in China.
All monetary units have been converted to British Sterling or U.S. dollars
based on the official exchange rates at the time. $HK 5. 71 =$US 1; $US 2.80 =UK 1;
$US 1-Chinese RMP 21,400 (1949); 31,000 (1950); 22,890 (1951); 23,430 (1952); 23,430
(1953); 25,200 (1954).
London interview with Sir John Keswick, November 27, 1975.
2. This was originally proposed in a letter from the British Chamber of
Commerce to the British Ambassador to China on November 30, 1948.
3. British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to China Association, London,
in C.A.M.C. May 12, 1949 No. 49/G/29.
4. Ibid.
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British firms had to deal simultaneously with several severe
problems. First and most immediate, the Nationalists' continuing
blockade of Shanghai caused the closing of the port, and as part
of a more general industrial paralysis throughout Shanghai, the
slow stifling of all enterprises in which British capital was
invested ensued. Affected initially were shipping wharves,
warehouses, banking and merchant houses. Subsequently, manufacturers were affected due to the exhaustion of supplies of needed
imported raw material and fuel, and the corresponding reduction
in utility services. 5
The British Chamber's request for British government
intervention in terms of the broad "internationalization" proposal
was apparently never seriously considered in official government
circles. The Chamber did not, however, give up. Even after the
Communist takeover of Shanghai, it persisted in requesting
official British support to directly intervene, the goal now being
the breaking of the Nationalist blockade of China. The Chamber's
efforts are testimony to the British business community's
ingrained dependence on official British military power as well as
to the various civil war related problems. 6
Realizing the problems created by the blockade in July, 1949,
Chamber of Commerce representatives noted to Hector McNeil,
the British Minister of State, that "unless some relief is found, it
would have to be recognized that the British commercial stake in
Shanghai might be lost." 7 McNeil's response was a flat refusal of
any assistance, particularly military assistance, owing in part to
policy differences between the United States and Britain. The
United States leaned towards withdrawal from, and isolation of,
China. 8 The British were anxious at all levels to work out a modus
vivendi, but their post-World War II policy had become subordinated to U.S. policy. The U.S. State Department favored a
blockade of China out of the fear that American and British

5. British -Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, to China Association (C.A.),
London in C.A.M.C. July 4, 1949 No. 49/B/40.
6. See China Association (London) to British Chamber of Commerce
(Shanghai), in C.A.M.C., July 21, 1949 No. 49/G/43.
7. Notes of meeting between C.A. representatives and Mr. Hector McNeil,
Minister of State, in C.A.M.C., July 28, 1949.
8. Ibid.
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private enterprise, if left alone, would cooperate with the Communists.9
Given these political realities, discussions between British
business leaders from Shanghai and Minister Hector McNeil
could hardly have eased British businessmen's fears for the future
of British investments in China. The discussions emphasized the
decided vulnerability of the fixed assets foreigners had built up
over the previous hundred years in China. Although the firms still
desired to remain in Shanghai, they faced unusual difficulties. To
meet the challenge of the difficulties, the British Chamber even
entertained the possibility of a private "buccaneer" action in an
effort to break the blockade and to reopen the vital transport link
between Hong Kong and Shanghai. As a last resort to salvage
something of the pre-Communist era, but also in a longer term
view, the Chamber suggested the possibility of putting Taiwan
under international jurisdiction. Whatever the outcome of the civil
war, it was argued, China would need finance and an international jurisdiction in Taiwan would provide a firm foundation for
raising money and sustaining profits. 10
Foreign firms' problems had many sources, including the fact
that the Chinese Communists were not overly sympathetic to their
problems. New Chinese regulations, for example, prohibited labor
cutbacks or economic retrenchment on the part of either Chinese
or foreign private firms. With little profit being made in Shanghai,
foreign firms were at times compelled to rely for their continued
financing on resources outside China which previously had been
withdrawn with relative ease. One British firm reportedly brought
into China £37,000 from Hong Kong for the month of September,
.1949, to meet various expenses, mainly wages.
The Chinese Communists, of course, had pressing problems of
their own, the resolution of which often required action antagonistic to foreign interests. The new Chinese authorities sought, for
example, to reduce the effects of inherited inflation by linking
workers' wages to the price of rice. Due to the effects of war and
flooding, the price of rice had continued to rise steadily thereby
increasing wage payments by the firms. As the Chinese tried to
maintain a steady standard of living, Chinese policy often
9. For an analysis of the conflicting policy preferences between the American
government and a single American firm, see Warren W. Tozer, "Last Bridge to
China: The Shanghai Power Company, The Truman Administration and the
Chinese Communists," in Diplomatic History, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1977.
10. Cf. note 8.
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required the firms to bring Sterling into China from London and
Hong Kong. From March to July, 1949 there was a three-fold
increase in the price of rice in China, the partial cost of which the
firms were required to pay.
These initial problems and fears concerning new Chinese
Government policies were part of longer term problems and fears
relating to the future of foreign business under Communist rule.
As early as July, 1949, both individual firms' records and China
Association records indicate fears among foreign firms, particularly small ones, of liquidation.H These fears were not groundless.
In Tientsin, foreign banks had been closed and their funds frozen
in February, 1949. In practical terms this meant that firms with
no local earnings, a common condition in a war-time situation,
found it difficult to even pay their staffs. Some firms, like BritishAmerican Tobacco and the oil companies, had stocks which they
could sell, but at various times others had to borrow from outside
China. Bringing in funds from outside China was made necessary
in July when the Chinese authorities in Tientsin exacted an
£800,00 levy from various groups of private firms, including
foreign ones. 12
From the vantage point of Shanghai in summer 1949, nobody
knew if the July levy or other provisions promulgated by the new
regime should be taken as precedents in planning for an uncertain
future. From China Association records it appears that some
British merchants felt that Chinese policy would seek to elbow out
foreign traders in favor of Chinese rivals as soon as possible. Yet
few heads of firms believed that completely closing down their
China-based operations was inevitable. 13
An important reason for this continued hope for the future
was that all the propaganda put forward by the Chinese
Communists urged foreign, as well as Chinese, merchants,
industrialists and bankers to remain in areas likely to come under
Communist control as their "assistance would be needed in
developing the country's trade." After Tientsin was occupied by
Communist forces in mid-January of 1949, for example, public

11. See C.A. memorandum, "The Present Position of British Traders in
China," in C.A.M.C., August 17, 1949 No. 49/G/49.
12. British Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai) to C.A. (London), in C.A.M.C.,
July 14, 1949, No. 49/F/13.
13. Cf. 13.
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announcements from General Chu Teh made this point. 14 A
similar propaganda effort followed in Shanghai.
Beyond generalities, however, the specific information which
would help British businessmen to form an estimate of the new
regime's policy toward Western firms was not forthcoming. One
reason may have seen that formulating that policy was not of
highest priority. In any event, in areas where the Communists
had taken control they had studiously avoided intercourse with
the British trade consuls, 15 consequently worrying British
businessmen. In the case of Jardine Matheson, however, the
firm's executives did not believe that the Chinese were out to
completely destroy foreign business activity.
Jardine Matheson's managers, in addition to certain anxieties, had a very positive initial impression of the new regime. "The
new authorities appeared to have a very realistic approach to their
problems," confirmed Sir John Keswick, Jardine Matheson's head
man in Shanghai at the time. 16 Heavy taxation, for example, was
not, in Keswick's view, a result of anti-foreignism as such but a
sign of the need for capital to meet the expenses of a big army and
a new government.
Jardine Matheson's early favorable reaction to the new
regime was also based particularly on its perception of the
honesty of Chinese Communist tax officials and of a certain
flexibility among Chinese officials with taxes when general
economic conditions permitted. "In the process of being examined
for payment of taxes," Keswick noted, "we came through
satisfactorily and were left with a favorable impression of the
efficiency of the examiners." Keswick added, "They used one of
our telephones in order to call for some information and
immediately insisted on paying cash for the telephone call they
had made. They would not accept even the offer of a cigarette!" 1 7
In addition, certain of China's economic policies actually
reduced financial pressure on foreign firms, such as the change in
July, 1950 from requiring constant wages to be based on rice
quotations to wages based on Parity Deposit Units (P.D.U.). For
foreign firms this was a more satisfactory arrangement because
the initial basis for rice prices was liable to manipulation. By

14. C.A., "General Bulletin," in C.A.M.C., January 20, 1949, No. 49/M/1.
15. C.A., C.A.M.C., January 20, 1949, No. 49/G/9.
16. Sir John Keswick of Jardine Matheson and Co., interview, London,
November 27, 1975.
17. Ibid.
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contrast the value of the P.D.U.s was jointly bilsed on current
quotations for rice, coal, briquettes, cloth and cooking oil which
were less likely to be manipulated. Foreign enterprise similarly
benefited from an unexplained waiver on Income Tax # 1, a
business profits tax for the first eight months of 1949, and from a
cancellation of the Business License Tax, established before 1949
by the Nationalist regime as a yearly tax on capital.
While managers of British firms believed in September, 1949,
that it was too soon to know if they would be able to trade with the
new regime, later impressions indicate some optimism that this
would be the case. Keswick believed that the top people in the
Chinese Government were able and honest. The rapid takeover in
the cities, he felt, meant that many "country boys" without urban
experience were obliged to work in a new and different invironment. It was on this basis that Keswick attributed any "pettiness
in labor disputes," which, under the circumstances, he viewed as
quite excusable.1s
Pettiness in labor disputes, of course, was not the main issue
for the future of foreign enterprise in China. The issue of whether
there was a firm basis for optimism was much more complex. A
pessimist might have to be convinced of any profit-making future
in China. Some businessmen believed that quite unrevolutionary
changes had come about to which foreign enterprise would adjust.
Nobody was at all certain of his own analysis. Optimistic
assessments of the profit-making future were accompanied by a
painful realization, often from the vantage point of Shanghai, that
a profound irreversible change in business conditions had
occurred.
In analyzing his own firm's future, a famous taipan, as the
heads of the largest firms were called, recognized that a number of
preexisting conditions for doing business in China had been
transformed. Most important, he wrote, was that foreign businessmen had to realize that "conditions under which British traders
have operated in China during the last century have changed
completely." By this he meant:
(O)ur treaties of privilege have gone and we shall never see
extraterritoriality again. This means that we must live and
trade in China under Chinese law, subject to Chinese habits
and customs, and with only such protection as our officials
are able to give us (this will be the same as in the period
previous to 1842), and subject to the whims of politics which
18. Ibid.
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are bound to change during the formative years of the
current Chinese revolution, which only started not quite four
decades ago. 19
In presenting his position that China had in fact made an historic
turnabout, the taipan concluded that the leftward trend of Chinese
politics would continue for a number of years, during which time
British firms would be weakened greatly. These assumptions
prompted him to conclude that although the Chinese wanted
foreign trade, foreign traders would only be able to survive the
trend with trading machinery modeled to fit new conditions.
A plan was sometimes proposed to deal with the situation, the
essence of which was the development of a large combine of
British China firms, each of which would surrender some of its
individuality in order to prevent debilitating competition among
themselves within a business environment now controlled by the
Chinese whose bargaining position was unchallenged. A spirit of
"united we stand and divided we fall" was a central element of the
combine proposal. Most important to its proponents was a united
British front on all political and commercial problems in China
·with a uniform approach to labor, wage and tax questions. In
addition, it was hoped thereby to secure maximum business
efficiency by exploiting economies of scale to provide financial
strength for large-scale contracts with the Chinese state trading
companies. According to the plan, joining the combine would have
been voluntary. Any British firm could remain outside the
combine, although this was contrary to the directed goal of unity.
The reaction to the above proposal by a British banker in
London was one of unambiguous resistance. "Unless the firm and
its staff can continue as a privately owned or public company on
its own British feet in China," wrote this businessman, "it must
dwindle away." No grouping of interests or Sino-British "halfcaste amalgamation," was sufficiently attractive, "or indeed, in
my opinion, workable in practice." 20 The response to the proposal
reflected skepticism about the irreversible nature of the historic
turnabout in business conditions in China. "We are in a state of
change or revolution," a skeptic wrote, and asked, "Must not the
dust settle before we take drastic decision to act irrevocably?" In
answer as to h~w to proceed with British trade in an unknown
19. Confidential document, Shanghai, July 30, 1949. Detailed documentation
of this and other sources must remain without direct documentation.
20. Confidential document, London, October 20, 1949.
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future under monopoly or nationalist conditions, such schemes as
the combine proposal always surfaced as a possible solution.
Unable to appreciate from London the difference between the
temporary difficult conditions of the past and the historic changes
brought on by the Chinese Communist Revolution, another
British businessman wrote about mergers in October 1949:
It is the same urge which I fear prompted me successively to
scheme for what appeared then to be the only progressive
enlightened solution for our future, firstly, by taking into
partnership the Generalissimo and the Soongs, and secondly
and even more foolhardy, by forming an Anglo-Japanese
Company to take over all our business in what appeared to
be then a permanently controlled China by Japan. They were
both ill-founded ideas, and fortune, perhaps more accurately,
events, saved us from being led prematurely into such
commitments, conceived when the forces and circumstances
surrounding our position in China seemed overwhelmingly
against us. 21

The lack of enthusiasm for the 1949 combine proposal
stemmed directly from a clear understanding of the goal of foreign
enterprise in China, to make remittable profits from private
enterprise. The combine should only be a last resort in this view.
While it was granted that the combine might inevitably be the
only way to remain in China, it was also thought that the
combine, even as a last resort, might prove unworkable. British
firms had offices in London which retained capital and various
reserves intact; they were reluctant to surrender their identity and
control of these funds. While the smaller firms with hardly any
reserves might be willing to join the combine, a British
businessman noted, "I cannot see the big oil boys, tobacco kings,
or soap czars, for example, willingly combining until the situation
is far more crystallized and finally desperate than it is now." 22
A leading British firm's head representative in Hong Kong
reflected a view of the business future which was influenced by
the Chinese banker Wang Ming. Wang's optimism for foreign
enterprise in China stemmed from two events. First, as part of
Mao Tse-tung's policy for the period of New Democracy, refugee
textile industrialists in Hong Kong had been approached by
Peking to return to Shanghai. Peking, according to Wang Ming,
21. Confidential document, London, November 2, 1949.
22. Ibid.
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had given them assurances against increased demands by labor
and assurances of free entry and exit from Shanghai. Consequently, many industrialists had decided to return to Shanghai.
The second source of Wang's optimism was his belief that
Peking had decided "to let commercial banks in Shanghai carry
on business as before." A british firm's internal memorandum
notes:
These banks apparently still have foreign assets and while
they have been registered with the new government they
have not been touched, nor does a reliable source think they
will be. The new Minister of Economics has recently been in
Shanghai and the source contacts report to him that it will
not be the policy of the new regime to nationalize commercial
banks for at least ten or twenty years as it is realized they
play an important function in the life of Shanghai which it is
the desire of the government to build up and further
industrialize. 23
These competing assessments of the future for foreign
enterprise in China reflected the past experiences of each businessman during the pre-communist era in China. From the vantage point of Shanghai it was possible to see most clearly the
terms of a historic turnabout in China. In London a British
banker might see only "the possibility of waiting two or three
years until we can open up again." Wang Ming, who influenced a
leading British firm's Hong Kong analysis of the future,
appreciated neither the dramatic changes in business conditions
in China, nor the speed and irreversibility of that change.
What is striking in the debate about the future of foreign
enterprise in China is the early indication of the essentially
passive role the firms would play in influencing the new rules and
regulations under which they might operate in China. Unlike the
hundred years prior to 1949 when British firms and the British
government significantly determined the business environment
for foreign capitalism, the Chinese government was now completely controlling the environment in which these firms precariously existed and, in their own defense, could contribute very
little. The Chinese Communists, to whose victory foreign firms
had barely contributed, owed the foreign firms very little, if
anything at all. And in fact, because they had so little leverage,
the British firms feared that foreign trade with China would take
23. Confidential document, London, October 19, 1949.
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place solely on Chinese terms, perhaps through Chinese government monopolies, with the British government unable to do
anything about it. Gradually foreign businessmen would realize
that they had become nearly powerless hostages to a past once
marked by great political and economic power.
B. Revolutionary Realities

The Chinese People's Government was determined that
economic development within China should primarily serve the
interests of China and its people. On this basis, with the urban
economy in a state of shambles after almost twenty years of
continuous warfare, China's new leaders had few sympathies for
British firms and their profit and loss accounts. Firms questioned
whether foreign enterprise would be permitted the minimal
security, opportunity, freedom of movement and freedom from
excessive taxation required in their view to remain in China.
But these issues could not be separated from the Chinese
revolution or the historic downturn in, for example, Britain's
foreign affairs. The post-World War II era saw the erosion of
British power and influence throughout Asia, the subordination of
British policy to American interests and the rise to power of the
Chinese Communists. The decline of Britain's influence in Asia
had important repercussions for the security of British firms since
in the past the preventive and punitive roles of British military
power had assured protection for these firms in China and helped
to maintain various privileges. For example, if a British firm were
having labor troubles, before 1949, a gunboat from Britain's
China Fleet would be sent to the area as a "precautionary
measure" to make it "easier for consul and others concerned to
deal with a difficult situation." Even when things were quiet, as
Stephen Endicott writes, "British Chambers of Commerce recorded
their appreciation of the fact that the sight of gunboats comforted
British merchants by smoothing the channels of trade." 24
The end of Britain's historic gunboat policies is exemplified
by the April, 1949 incident involving the British frigate H.MS.
Amethyst. When the Amethyst was sailing from Shanghai to
Nanking to relieve the destroyer Consort, which was then at
Nanking and beginning to run short of supplies, the Chinese
Communists engaged the ship in a battle that eventually involved
four other British gunboats and resulted in the deaths of several
24. Stephen Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprises (Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia Press, 1975), p. 9.
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hundred British and Chinese troops and the end of gunboat
diplomacy. After the Amethyst incident the traditional British
gunboat solution for various problems in China gave way before
the power and permanence of Chinese Communist rule. 25
British merchants realized very early after the Communists
took power that the Chinese Communist Party was "here to stay,"
although some British merchants felt that few Chinese were really
communists, and that it would take many years to convert them.
In the new environment, where British merchants no longer could
depend on warships to solve their problems, the various firms'
only hope of remaining in China was to reach a mutually
acceptable modus vivendi with the People's Government.
Because of the "natural anti-communism" which some
Britis4. firms viewed as a permanent Chinese characteristic, "the
best and only way of checking the spread of communism," notes a
China Association memorandum, "was for democratic powers to
maintain and develop friendly relations with the Chinese people
and the Chinese government." 26 In pursuit of this policy, the
China Association exerted its influence in favoring formal
diplomatic relations between England and China as a precondition for settling grievances, in the short term, and implementing a
Treaty of Commerce, from which British firms would no doubt
profit, in the long termY While a favorable possibility the plan
remained only a proposal. The British merchants became
hostages to the determination of the People's Government to
operate the new economic environment in the interests of its own
people; the People's Government demanded that they continue to
operate in China irrespective of their losses.
While operating with these immediate losses, a major effort of
the firms was to assess exactly what China's long-term policy
towards foreign capitalism would be. Some firms, under the
cumulative effect of several incidents, mainly involving labor and
tax disputes between British firms and Chinese workers, concluded that their future in China was a limited one. In representing these firms, Michael Lindsay, the former British Embassy
press attache, personally delivered a memorandum to Chou En-lai
noting his impression that "it is the deliberate policy of the new
government to subject foreign business to obstruction and
25. Even Luard, Britain and China, (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p.
83-103.

26. C.A. memorandum, October 11, 1949, Bulletin No. 42.
27. C.A. memorandum, November 1, 1949, No. 49/E/15.
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annoyance as part of a plan to drive them out of China." 28 The
cause of Sino-British business troubles in late 1949, according to
Lindsay, lay in differences between Chinese and British approaches to problem-solving. Lindsay's impression of the Chinese
perspective, for example, was to decide on a basic policy of
principle to be worked out in practice. Lindsay interpreted the
normal British approach, on the other hand, to be based on
solving immediate practical problems and, on this basis, to
develop a "working policy of principle." If both sides would only
understand and appreciate these differences, Lindsay hoped that
British firms and the People's Government might be able to live
together on good terms.
But Lindsay was wrong. The issue was not whether the
People's Government and the British firms could live together on
some abstract "good terms," but on whose terms they would live
together, if at all. And the answer to that question was
increasingly clear. In one of the rare public statements of its
position, the Chinese approach was summed up by China's
Liberation Daily News in a note in August 1950:
Although foreign interests are owned by foreigners under the
jurisdiction of the People's Government these enterprises
have been deprived of their special privileges which they
enjoyed in the past . . . if they can dutifully obey all
ordinances and rulings of the People's Government and
engage in business which is beneficial to the livelihood of the
people and the livelihood of our country, they will be
permitted to exist and will be protected. 2 9
Since such explicit policy statements were rare, China's policy
towards foreign firms has to be extrapolated from these few
statements as well as from the foreign firms' statements, China
Association documents and from China's practice. It appears to be
as follows: The Chinese in the long run wanted to completely take
control of their economy. This required, in the Chinese view,
driving foreign capitalists out of the country. The method to
achieve this goal, as the Liberation News statement suggests, was
through ordinances and rulings by the People's Government. The
ensuing indirect approach insured that foreign capitalism
operated under terms profitable for China and that such
operations would become relatively unprofitable for the firms.
28. Ibid.
29. Liberation Daily, August 6, 1950.
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Requiring the continued payment of taxes and wages by firms
was in the People's Government's interest; outright confiscation
probably was not.
The opportunity of British firms for profit-making was limited
by a variety of factors. First and foremost, the People's
Government was primarily concerned not with their profits but
with production and the employment of Chinese workers. Cities
were swollen by refugees; industrial production and most other
economic activities were far below pre-war peaks; employment
was high; and inflation and food shortages reflected both a
collapse of administration and major structural dislocations after
decades of continuous warfare. To compound these problems,
China's new leaders had neither the experience nor the training
necessary to cope with the demands of an urban, industrial
economy whose reconstruction in any event was hampered by the
Nationalist blockade.
The People's Government tried immediately to deal with this
difficult situation which involved regulating the conditions for the
sale of China's labor power and completely undercutting the
ability of foreign capitalism to maintain an environment
congenial to their profit-making. The effect of these policies on
British firms was to require remittances from abroad in order to
meet operating overheads, wages and taxes.
Closure of businesses was not permitted in China after 1949
without explicit permission from the People's Government. In
practice, the government refused to seriously consider requests for
firms to close down and withdraw staff until the liabilities of the
firm grew to be nearly equal to or in excess of its assets. The
length of time during which liabilities accumulated was determined by the People's Government in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogatives, not by foreign firms who were now subject to the
conditions set forth by the new government. These conditions
included approval for closure only upon labor's agreement to the
necessity of closing and an acceptable severance pay agreement
for former employees of the firm.
Consequently, the firms were caught in a squeeze. On the one
hand, hostage capitalism meant the refusal on the part of the
People's Government to permit, by any means, the closure of
industry or business of value to the nation's economy. On the
other hand, firms were not in control of their labor policy. Like
most laws, China's laws were framed in such a way as to permit
several interpretations. A Western lawyer recalls this difficulty in
the following way: "The law might read that Unions," for
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example, "shall not usurp or interfere with the administration
rights of management," but "unions shall have the right of
suggestion and protest of any matter which in the opinion of the
union affects the workers' present or future livelihood.":JJ In
applying such potentially conflicting principles, arbitration
seldom found sympathy with foreign firms. Glaring examples of
the lack of freedom to "do business as usual" occurred during both
the Nationalist blockade and the UN embargo when wharves in
Shanghai and other areas were nearly completely closed but
workers nonetheless had to be paid by the firms.
The firms were both "hostages" to their past and in some
sense also "hostages" to their future hopes for China trade. If
efforts at closure ultimately were depenrlent upon the good will of
the People's Government, that good will was important to the
firms for more reasons than one. There still remained the hope for
future profits. For fear of jeopardizing the potential longer term
profitable trade relationship between the People's Government
and a consolidated firm operating outside of China, foreign firms
were generally uncertain as to how energetically they should
pursue closure. Thus, short term uncertainty and hard times had
to be weighed against longer term hopes and expectations.
For many foreign firms, remittances from reserves abroad
were necessary to keep the firms operating in times of depressed
business. And they had to keep operating unless they received
permission to close. In order to function they had to retain their
property which, in turn, meant paying tax. To insure that such
obligations would be met, the Chinese required the continuing
presence of a senior European firm executive in China. Hostage
capitalism was reinforced with hostage capitalists. At least one of
the senior executives, who was required to have Power of
Attorney, typically was held personally responsible for performance of his firm's obligations and payment of taxes, refusal of
which, for however good reason, might have resulted in imprisonment.
Until permission to cease firm operations was granted,
permission to leave China was denied for at least one European
official from within the firm. Thus, when a manager of a large
firm desired to leave, he was required first to produce for the
Bureau of Foreign Affairs a letter or telegram from the head office
appointing his successor, notifying the successor of this appointment and requesting his acceptance; a letter from the named
30. Confidential interview, London, November 29, 1975.
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successor to the existing manager accepting the post and
accepting full responsibility attached to the position, the successor's Power of Attorney or the incumbent's Power of Attorney
with a Deed of Substitution in favor of the successor; and a fairly
detailed history of the successor's education, working life and
qualifications. While this requirement was in effect, British firms
never used the frequently discussed tactic of unilaterally stopping
remittances of China to force liquidation negotiations to begin.
They feared jeopardizing the safety of their European staff. 31
China's rules and regulations were harsh in their effect on
foreign firms, but they appear to have been strictly enforced
primarily in the interest of improving the Chinese economy and
only secondarily for purposes of historic revenge. Nevertheless, at
times, with all of the regulations placed on foreign firms, trade
came to a near standstill. Only a few merchants, for example,
were importing and exporting through Tsingtao and Tientsin. At
other times, as from January to October 1950, the Chinese
economy showed substantial signs of improvement and foreign
firms benefited. As China's currency showed signs of more
stability, the fear of intolerable tax burden.s receded somewhat,
and as the pressure to buy new government bonds eased, the
strains on foreign firms lightened. The rich harvests, the revival
of modest trade, the evidence of incorruptibility and the development of sound reconstruction in China clearly increased confidence in the new government. As a result, internal purchasing
power and internal trade increased significantly.
The earlier fear among foreign firms that taxation might take
the form of confiscatory levies based on presumed ability to pay
proved largely groundless. Business taxes in fact were levied on
the basis of turnover. There was a reduction in property taxes of
thirty-six percent for business premises, of ten percent for
residential premises and of twenty percent for land tax. These
developments, perceived by foreign firms as change in China's
policy, did not go unappreciated by the firms.
The short term adjustment by both Peking and foreign firms
to the new environment, however, did not and could not resolve
what, in retrospect, can be seen as permanent difficulties in
Shanghai for all firms. Take for example the case of several
individual British firms in Shanghai. 32 In April, 1950, there was

a

31. C.A.M.C., April 4, 1950, No. 50/6/27 and C.A.M.C., "Present Trading
Conditions in China," October 15, 1950.
32. Information on the cases that follow must remain without direct attribu·
tion.
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little demand for the products of these firms and, with the
Nationalist blockade, the foreign wharves had done ljttle or no
business for ten months. To make matters still worse, the
traditional creditor, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, had no
deposits of Chinese currency left and did not in any event want
more financial risks in China.
Given business conditions, a particular textile firm was in
crisis. This firm had inventory stocks valued at approximately
$US 300,000 of which more than half consisted of blankets and
seasonal yarns for which no volume sales could be expected until
June. Its large stock of worsted cloth, moreover, had not been
selling for some time because of the change after 1949 to more
basic Communist-inspired clothing styles among potential Chinese buyers. Stocks of goods had been difficult to sell except in
small quantities; the sales price scarcely covered the cost of the
cotton used in production. 33
Notwithstanding the poor prospects for short-term substantial
sales revenues, wages and taxes still had to be paid. An additional
£70,000 was needed before the end of April. This was considered
impossible to raise, especially since the mill already had an
overdraft with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank of £120,000
Although the firm hoped the bank would carry the overdraft as
long as possible, a bank official noted, "Because deposits are
decreasing as everyone is drawing out money they have with the
bank, therefore it might be very difficult to allow the overdraft to
run on."
Another British firm, a bottling company, was in an equally
bad way, perhaps worse. April sales were terrible; only about
thirty to fifty cases of various drinks a day were being sold,
whereas sales normally were at least 500 cases a day at this time
of year. The bottling company, had an overdraft with the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank of approximately £3,000. That loan,
according to the firm's records, was to be paid on April 10, 1950.
But there was no money in the bottling company's coffers to meet
the obligation. All that could be done to deal with the virtually
hopeless financial quagmire, in the opinion of a Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank official, was to let shareholders of each of the
firms know about the precarious position of their investment.
The foreign wharf companies had seen only a handful of
ships come to Shanghai since the liberation of.China. Yet they too
were being squeezed since overheads had risen substantially.
33. Confidential document, Shanghai, May 2, 1949.

26

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Wages were the main cause of rising overheads. Some Chinese
workers who in the past had been treated as seasonal employees,
when work was determined by the company based on the number
of boats in port, had now been transformed into permanent
employees under the new mandatory People's Government
regulations. This meant more than a thousand "permanent"
Chinese workers were now on the payroll. Attempts by the firms
to reduce either numbers of workers or wages were unsuccessful.
One shipping company was draining reserves at the rate of about
£20,000 a month, with only £85,000 left by April of 1950 out of
local reserves estimated at the beginning of 1949 at over £200,000.
The company's annual land taxes alone, levied on both land and
houses, were approximately £20,000 to £25,000. Consequently,
"unless some reduction in wages could be secured," a firm's
director wrote in 1950, "funds would run out before the end of
June." 34
As can be seen from the condition of these firms, British firms
generally were in trouble. At the highest decision-making levels
among British executives in Hong Kong, London and Shanghai,
discussions were held in search of a course of action to protect the
firms against the pressures of hostage capitalism.
The fact was, however, that many British firms did have a
policy to minimize losses under currently unfavorable but
uncertain conditions. "I considered we did have a policy but the
implementation of any policy was entirely dependent on the
conditions under which it could be executed." On what the future
profitability for the firm might be, "I found myself like the
agnostic," a famous Shanghai taipan noted "I just did not know
. . . the signs were that our future in China was hopeless, but I
was never prepared to say definitely that we would not survive." 35
The harsh reality of the firms' poor bargaining position
starkly determined their policies. Differences in the degree of
optimism for the firms' future prospects in China among senior
firm executives, and their differences in outlook, which in normal
times might have been significant, were made insignificant by
that harsh reality. No matter the differences in attitude, the heads
of leading British firms per force agreed on the immediate policy
to employ: reduce overhead, reduce commitments by refusing all
offers of new business, trade only in profitable fields and prepare
for closure when and if the opportunity should arise.
34. Confidential document, Shanghai, April 8, 1950.
35. Confidential interview, London, November 28, 1975.
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In pursuance of this policy, one firm in Shanghai managed
between May, 1949 and May, 1950 to reduce its own staff as
follows: British employees from 48 to 43, or 26%; local foreigners
33 to 22, or 33%; Chinese from 321 to 290, or 10%.
The same firm's preparations for liquidation involved communicating a two-sided message to the Chinese authorities. It
would not further finance from holdings abroad its various
business operations in China and, without Chinese cooperation,
the firms would simply dissolve. With a view towards their
liquidation, target dates for the closure of trade offices outside
Shanghai, in Chungking, !chang, Changsha, Hankow, Kinkiang,
Wuhu, Nanking, Chinkiang, Foochow, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Canton
and Swatow were also set. Thus, the firm in preparing for closure
sought to limit additional remittances to China to extricate itself
from investments in China while, at the same time, endeavoring
to concentrate on trade with China in order both to cover various
other losses and tailor its operations to a new trade-dominated
relationship with China.
If the closure of British direct investment in China was
inevitable, hopes for a long-term relationship often were difficult
to sustain. The short-term trade prospects varied with more
general international conditions. Generally speaking many
British firms benefited, on the one hand, by the beginning of the
Korean War, which resulted in a threefold increase in Hong Kong
exports to China from the 1950 level of $US 14,000 to $US 335,080
for the six-month period prior to June 1951. 36 On the other hand,
shortly after the war began, British firms in China, for example,
suddenly and swiftly became victims of the UN embargo of China
which Britain agreed to observe. Under these conditions any
British trade with China became difficult. In response to the
embargo, most Western nations, including Britain, restricted their
trade with China to items such as cotton, fertilizer, textile
machinery, dyes and drugs.
In this context, China feared the complete halt of imports
from abroad. 37 Because of the conditions imposed by the Korean
War and the UN embargo, China abandoned normal methods of
commercial trading and financing in favor of various types of
barter deals in which exports were permitted only against
virtually assured imports. Any imbalances which accumulated
36. Even Luard, op. cit., p. 68.
37. Pauline Lewin, The Foreign Trade of Communist China, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1964), pp. 30-38.
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were kept small and short term. China shifted to barter trade as a
direct result ot Chma's unfortunate experience when the U.S.
government froze Chinese assets located in the U.S. Subsequently,
Peking wanted to avoid maintaining or building up other assets
abroad that might be frozen without warning or redress should
America's more forward policy be followed by its Allies in the
West.
For their part the Chinese tried to circumvent the effect of the
embargo in another way, by switching the main flow of China's
trade from the West to the Soviet and East European bloc. They
also sought to make it as uncomfortable as possible for those who
maintained the embargo. What this meant, as Chen Ming,
China's Vice-Minister of the Foreign Trade Ministry for the East
China Region, explained to a British firm's representatives, was
that China was only prepared to trade provided there was "full ·
security for China." Evidently this is why in 1951 the Chinese
promulgated new regulations denying permission for Chinese
export goods to be shipped until the purchase money was
deposited in China by telegraphic transfer. This meant that
foreign importers and exporters had to finance the cost of their
imports to China until such time as they could recover their outlay
from the sale of exports from China. Foreign firms were reluctant
to remit money to China on the terms demanded. There was no
guarantee in the event of a non-executed contract that the goods
would be shipped or that the deposit would be refunded.
AP. part of the Chinese policy of obtaining "full security for
China," the Chinese required that all foreign contracts be
guaranteed against non-compliance. Because British banks
charged an insurance fee of one-eighth of one percent of the value
of the contract and put a time limit on their guarantees
unacceptable to China, British firms established a policy of
guaranteeing each other's contracts. For example, in the event
that Shell failed to meet the provisions of a contract with the
People's Government, the guaranteeing firm, Swires, would be
liable. In this situation many firms decided that the benefits of
trading with China were outweighed by the risks.
British firms, then, were obstructed from all sides, not just by
the Chinese Communists. Prior to the Korean War, the firms were
trying to cope with new Chinese regulations which effectively
limited the profitability of China's trade and investment. After the
Korean War began, becausE' of the UN embargo, firms had the
new difficulty of locating supplies for export to China in barter
arrangements acceptable to the British government. Peking, in
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tum, stiffened in not approving Chinese exports unless suitable
imports were lined up to utilize the proceeds. Understandably, the
People's Government was afraid of receiving unusable foreign
exchange, of acquiring freezable Chinese assets abroad and of a
drain on outputs without compensating inputs.
British finns, caught in the middle, feared violating the
embargo, as well as being placed on an unofficial black-list in the
United States for trading with China at all. To complicate
matters, within China there were analogous retaliatory restrictions which adversely affected foreign firms. For example, in
addition to the imports-first requirement of the barter trade, the
Chinese placed the most popular export items on a "Special
Export List" requiring foreign firms to obtain official permission
for exporting.
The British firms were in a bind. Faced with a Chinese
government hostile to foreign capitalism and the British government's compliance with the U.S.-directed UN embargo hostile to
China, British firms concluded that from a purely trading angle
there was little justification for continuing trade with China. For
the leading British firms' part, however, the firms continued to
hope that their potential as exporters-importers, if not as foreign
investors in China, would serve as a basis for preserving good
relations. 38
The reason good relations were so important for the firms lay
in the reality of hostage capitalism. Foreign firms wanted to
reduce their many commitments throughout China. Closure,
however, was dependent upon the good will of the people's
Government. Maintaining good will had become especially
difficult when Britain agreed to the UN embargo of China. Efforts
at closure on the part of the leading firms were feared by the firms
to be possibly construed by the Chinese as a "lack of good faith."
As a result the leading British firms' executives in 1951 saw little
prospect of ever being permitted to close down their operations in
China without jeopardizing the potential longer-term trade
relationship between the People's Government and newly organized British "China firms" outside China.
38. See in passim., C.A.M.C., for 1950.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

THE BRITISH CHINA TRADE HAS HAD IT

31

Chapter III
"THE BRITISH CHINA TRADE HAS HAD IT"
A. The "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" campaigns
B. "This is Too Much"

By early 1952 conditions for British investment in China had
deteriorated to the point that they were no longer described in
terms of a hopeful "wait and see." The previous months' problems,
now exacerbated, in the view of the British firms, by China's
"San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" (Three-Anti Five-Anti) campaigns, affected
British firms' assessments of their future in China. "Surely the
picture is very clear for all to see," wrote a British taipan in
February, 1952, "and the writing is on the wall even in braille for
the blind ... British China trade has had it." 1 Simply getting out
of China on any terms was unacceptable, but inevitable.
The decision to withdraw from China was not an easy one for
British firms. Some firms, especially the larger ones, even considered retaining their properties, at least legally, in the hope that
either a new government would one day rule China or that
conditions of doing business under the People's Government
would change in order that various British commercial interests
could once again engage in profit-making. "The obvious maneuver
would have been to try to conduct our retreat so that the Chinese
are forced to take over our properties without our consent," noted
a British businessman." 2
The hope for a return to the previous era's business
environment presented great difficulties, in the words of another
taipan, "akin to wishing to give away our cake and still hold on to
it." 3 Even if properties were legally retained, perhaps by a lease
arrangement, various taxes amounting to large sums of hard
currency would have to be paid on an option of better business
conditions in an uncertain future. In the view of British
businessmen, there was every reason to believe, as a condition of
that option, that any succeeding non-Communist Chinese government might nationalistically say that the British had in fact
given up their land and buildings under the Chinese Communists,
1. Confidential document, Shanghai, February 26, 1952.
2. Confidential interview, London, December 1, 1975.
3. Ibid.
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and therefore they belonged to the new succeeding government.
Realizing this possibility, British firms unanimously agreed to
enlist the help of the British government with both negotiations
for the liquidation of British investments in China and for the
establishment of a new British organization whose purpose it
would be to trade with China from Hong Kong and London.
Maintaining China properties in any way was no longer
considered a possibility.

A. The "San-Fan" and "Wu-Fan" Campaigns
Chinese firms and foreign firms were orgamcally linked; they
did business with each other. It follows that any change in
business conditions affecting Chinese firms would affect foreign
firms. This was indeed the case with China's "San-Fan"
campaigns in late 1951 and early 1952.
While prior to 1949 the Chinese Communists had developed a
high degree of organizational skill in an agrarian environment,
the issue after the Communist Victory in 1949 was whether they
could handle the task of governing and developing the relatively
sophisticated and complex urban sector of Chinese society.
Shanghai, for example, was not simply a war-tom, refugeeswollen city which would become the industrial heart of the
People's Republic. Shanghai had also been a base for the defeated
Chinese Nationalists (KMT) and the center of foreign imperialism
in China. To the Chinese Communists, Shanghai, therefore, represented "the struggle against the cynicism of bureaucratic
capitalist speculation and the dead weight of imperialism." 4
The struggle proved to be lengthy. From the outset the
Chinese Communists' governing of Shanghai included a system
of price controls to force out of business private Chinese firms
involved in speculative ventures. Chinese capitalist elements
retained, however, a dominant position in Shanghai during the
first eighteen months under Communist rule. Rapid recruitment of
new members into the Communist Party to organize Shanghai
could not and did not prove adequate to prevent continuing
speculation, corruption and otherwise illegal business dealings
associated with the permissive atmosphere for which Shanghai
had been well known under Nationalist rule.
The party itself, in part, reflected the society within which it
had developed. Some Communist Party members were willing to
4. Soong Ching Ling, "Shanghai's New Day Has Dawned," in The Struggle
for New China, English translation (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p.
246.
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enrich themselves by engaging in bribery, the use of public funds
for private ventures and the sale of public property to private
individuals.s
China's continuing struggle against these undesirable elements in its society and within the Party took the form of a series
of mass-movement campaigns during late 1951 and early 1952.
The "San-Fan" (or Three-Anti) campaign against "corruption,
waste, and bureaucracy" in government offices in the winter of
1951-52 reviewed the conduct and discipline of Party and nonParty officials who failed to meet Chinese Communist Party
standards. The subsequent "Wu-Fan" (or Five-Anti) campaign,
which grew out of the immediately preceding "San-Fan" campaign, was specifically directed at Chinese businessmen who
allegedly engaged in bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property,
cheating on government contracts and stealing state economic
secrets. The effect of the two campaigns was to drastically weaken
the position of urban capitalists in China. Combined, "San-Fan"
and "Wu-Fan" reduced the wealth and assets of urban capitalists,
ostracized many as being potentially dangerous and subversive,
and eliminated any possibility of their maintaining or achieving
significant political influence during the period when China's
leaders wanted to socialize the country's economy.
The campaigns took the form of wide-scale denunciations and
confessions encouraged by the Chinese Communist Party. Many
of the charges espoused the general judgement that private profitmaking was exploitative, the equivalent of "stealing from the
people." As a result of the campaigns, People's Daily reported in
October, 1952 that seventy-six percent of all merchants and
capitalist industrialists in seven cities were found guilty of one or
more offenses and punished by fines exacted by the newly
established People's Tribunals. 6 At the same time, while the
Tribunals required the payment of various fines, Chinese firms
were prohibited by law from hiring or firing workers, altering
their wages, borrowing private capital or ceasing to operate.
The combination of economic hardship and psychological
demoralization so weakened China's capitalist sector that the
Chinese Communist leadership was able to organize and reinforce
a variety of control mechanisms, rejuvenated labor unions, for
fi. The best analysis of "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" which I have relied on, is John
Gardner. "The Wu-Fan Campaign in Shanghai," in A Doak Barnett (ed.), Chinese
Communist Politics in action ISeattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 477.'139.
6. People's Daily, October 1, 1952.
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example, in an effort to prevent a resurgence of bourgeois
influence. Most Chinese firms, weakened by the mass campaigns
that forced them to accept loans from the People's Bank, simply
became managers of production under state control and direction.
The campaigns "pushed private industry and commerce a step
towards state capitalism," Chou En-lai later remarked. 7
The "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" campaigns were conducted with
such intensity and effectiveness against Chinese firms that
foreign firms were affected as well. "Everything per force has
come to a virtual standstill," wrote a British businessman from
Shanghai. R Many Chinese government offices and Chinese firms
opened for normal business two hours a day, which barely
enabled them to deal with day-to-day routine business and made
all new business of any consequence out of the question. Chinese
firms which normally would have had business dealings with
British firms were tied up with "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" activities.
Beyond that, British firms came under direct fire in the
campaigns over matters concerning irregular practices, wages
and corruption. To illustrate, British firms usually paid higher
wages than most Chinese firms; jobs with these firms were
enthusiastically sought by Chinese workers. 9 Since most British
employers relied on a gang-boss system, whereby the number one
foreman recommended the workers to be employed, foremen
acquired immense power over workers seeking jobs. In exchange
for work, foremen usually exacted tolls from the wages of both
men and women workers, and with attractive women they
frequently exacted other favors as well. Sustained criticism of
these practices during "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" disrupted business
for British firms.
On another level, one British firm's staff got directly involved
in the campaigns when an Insurance Department head was
locked up and fined by the Chinese authorities for passing
business contracts in Shanghai to Hong Kong where taxes were
more favorable to the firm.
Events seemed to go from bad to worse for British firms in
China. Under the impact of the mass campaigns in China, the
courts ruled that it was illegal for any Chinese worker not to
receive his wages or for his livelihood to be jeopardized in any
way. Although this was a monumentally reasonable decision from
7. Chou En-lai, "A Great Decade," in Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1960), p. 27.
8. W.C. Gomersall, The China Engineers, Ltd., "Quarterly Review," November, 1951.
9. Ibid.
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the worker's point of view, British firms found it very difficult to
accept. From their point of view, past practices should be a guide
for the present. As a result, in March, 1952, a British executive, as
the responsible person for his firm's accounts, was locked up for a
week by a judge of a People's Tribunal for the firm's failure to
meet its February 1952 wage bill for 200 Chinese workers.
In an effort to resolve the problem, a leading British firm
asked for a reconsideration by the People's Tribunal of the firm's
need for financial assistance to meet wages, as well as the
payment of the firm's 1951 income tax without a penalty for late
payment. In the previous year, 1951, the firm had been able to
borrow from the Chinese-owned Best Service Bank and the
National Industrial Bank of China. Now, however, because of the
"San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" regulations, borrowing was not permitted.
The British firms' financial problems can be appreciated from
the beverage sales record of one British bottling firm from 1946 to
1951. 10 In each of these years, the average sales for January and
February combined had been 18,384 cases of various beverages. In
contrast, sales for January and February of 1952 amounted to
only 2,713 cases. The difference, in the firm's view, was largely
attributed to China's virtual deprivation of the foreign firm's right
to sell. The People's Government had recently established a
government bottling enterprise, amounting to a government
monopoly on bottling production and sales. As a result the foreign
bottling company's lack of local revenue created another problem
for the firm. The balance of its 1951 income tax was due on March
12 and was now accumulating a fme of one percent per day on
unpaid tax.w
In order to free its Shanghai-based executive the $HK
equivalent of $US 25,000 was raised from a friendly British firm
with the aid of the Hong Kong Bank to help pay February wages
and the previous year's income tax. In the meantime, in spite of
the government bottling company's virtual monopoly, British
business executives hoped for enough spring sales of various
beverages to provide revenue for operating expenses and to
prevent another visit to the Shanghai jail.
B.

((This is Too Much"

Until now the larger British firms had planned to continue
operating its various enterprises in China. A year ago foreign
executives were less certain that their firms would have an
10. Confidential interview with a British taipan, London, December 1, 1975.
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unprofitable future in China; now it was universally agreed that
"the crux of the matter is what is the least expensive way of
saying we plan to quit." How to do this, of course, was a great
issue when the Chinese government, and not British firms,
decided all business conditions. "There are increasing signs of the
bill mounting up every day we delay," and "this is too much,"
added a taipan.
Consequently, in March, 1952, China Association member
firms agreed that business conditions were so irreversibly dismal
that the British government should be asked to use whatever
offices it might have to expedite closure for British firms in
China.U An initial, immediate concern, noted in a China
Association memorandum, was how firms could be protected from
being required by the conditions of hostage capitalism to remit
funds from outside China to British firms in China. An often
proposed, but never implemented, defense was enactment of
British government-enforced licensing restrictions on the transfer
of sterling in China. China firms in the spring of 1952 heatedly
discussed this defense but were afraid that such a licensing
system might only bring swift retaliation by the Chinese.
Individually, each firm was making its own withdrawal
plans. As a part of one plan, several firms advocated a collective
approach among China firms working closely with the British
government. A central component of this approach entailed
announcing a date for cutting off all remittances from abroad in
order to force negotiations for closure to begin. Even if all of the
firms could agree that it was time to withdraw, there was not,
however, a consensus to establish a cut-off date for remittance of
Sterling to China. The British banks did not like the idea of a
deadline date at all, because they had commitments to the
Chinese government for the return of U.S. dollars which the U.S.
government had frozen. British American Tobacco, on the other
hand, was engaged in its own negotiations for closure with the
Chinese which, in the view of British American Tobacco, were
coming to a close. Shell, having been expropriated outright a year
earlier, was only interested in getting its five remaining staff
members out and opposed any deadline. In short, all of the firms
still perceived themselves as being in their own canoes and still
hoped to find a paddle or two that would allow individual profits
11. China Association telegram to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
"Withdrawal of British Firms from China-permits for Sterling Remittances,"
March 18, 1952, and Leo Lamb, British Charge d'affaires in Peking, to British
Foreign Office, March 17, 1952.
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so they could paddle according to their own specific circumstances. Without unanimity among them, the British government, of
course, would not consider arranging the restrictive licensing
procedures discussed.
Despite the lack of agreement on a cut-off date, various firms
and the British government were still able to agree to a plan of
action they hoped would expedite closure. A "two-shot" approach
was finally accepted. First, a statement was to be sent to the
Chinese by Leo Lamb, the British Charge D'affaires, who would
simply note that the various disabling policies affecting British
firms could only result in the elimination of British business
interests in China. This first note hopefully would pave the way
for a second note asking for negotiations to begin for the
liquidation of British firms in China. 12
Though in a poor bargaining position, British firms and the
British government hoped to be able to deliver the notes in such a
way as not to provoke the People's Government into sudden and
violent reaction, especially at the local level. British firms in
London and in Hong Kong worried immediately about the safety
of British staff in China, though their long-term concern was with
Britain's presence in Hong Kong and the future of Sino-British
trade.
Knowing that the involvement of the British government in
negotiating with the Chinese government was not likely to
significantly reduce the pressures of hostage capitalism, the
various firms' executives continued to pursue their own efforts
towards closure. It was a difficult no win situation. On the one
hand, a collective approach required the gamble that individual
concerns of various firms might be sacrificed to a greater degree
than in an individual effort. On the other hand, the firms feared
that negotiating individually for withdrawal would increase the
likelihood that "not only will (one firm) be played off against the
other but outstanding contracts might have to be executed to the
letter." So, serious problems existed even if fears of retaliation
against British staff in China, Hong Kong or future trade proved
groundless.
Various schemes were proposed within each British firm to
achieve the fastest possible closure. A problem for one of them,
getting rid of the burden of Hong Kong-domiciled companies,
12 For the first two notes see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence
Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Central People's Government ol China on British Trade in China,
Peking. April 12.July 5, 1952 (Cmd. 8639) (London HMSO, 1952), p. 2-3.
·
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included as an initial proposal the washed-sale of the parent
firm's controlling shares in the subsidiary firms so that the parent
firm could be disqualified under Hong Kong law from acting as
general managers.
"In order to play really safe, it seemed to me," wrote a British
taipan, "that the transfer should not be domiciled in the Far
East. I am wondered therefore about a suitable 'stooge'
company, registered, let us say, in Montevideo, which would
be prepared to hold these shares under a declaration of trust
in favor of the firm."13
The idea was for a purchaser to pay the market price of the parent
firm's shares, for which the parent firm would reimburse the
purchaser immediately from reserves held abroad. This, in the
view of the taipan, theoretically would have permitted the parent
firm to forfeit the Powers of Attorney for the subsidiary
companies and to be free of responsibility for the subsidiaries'
liabilities.
The problem with this scheme, as Chinese authorities made
very clear, was that the People's Government was not in the least
interested in the technicalities of Hong Kong business ordinances
or in the various attorneys' agreements between British parent
firms and their subsidiaries. To discourage a leading firm's
liquidation tactic, the Chinese authorities, perhaps aware of the
nature of the firm's internal discussions, showed great interest in
the possible transfer of parent company shares by asking for
detailed lists of shareholders in the subsidiary companies. More
conclusively, the Chinese reasserted that no firm could give up its
responsibilities without the approval of the People's Government.
In practical terms British firms were learning once again that
China was indeed calling the shots.
Yet, if only because British firms did have obligations to their
shareholders, the firms could not consider Hong Kong business
ordinances at Attorneys' agreements to be unimportant. In the
case of moving towards liquidation, for example, one British
firm's directors felt obliged to comply with Hong Kong Ordinances in getting the majority of the firm's shareholders to pass a
resolution in favor of liquidation. Otherwise, in the event of a
successful closure in China, the firm's directors feared fines for
non-compliance with Hong Kong business law and liability suites
against the directors by the more powerful of the shareholders in
Hong Kong. The firms were on the defensive from all sides.
13. Cf. 10.
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For the time being, however, British firms had no option but
"to sit tight" in anticipation of the British Diplomatic Notes, the
first of which was communicated by Leo Lamb to the People's
Government on April 12, 1952. As previously planned, this note
outlined the firms' difficulties and added, "If this situation
continues it can only result, sooner or later, in the elimination of
British business interests in China to the detriment of friendly
relations between China dnd the United Kingdom." A second
British Note was communicated to the Chinese on May 19, even
before China had replied to the first note. This second note stated
the obvious: "Nearly all, if not all, of the British companies in
China had come to the conclusion that (the change in Sino-British
business conditions brought on by the Chinese Communist
Revolution) necessitates a corresponding change in the nature of
their obligations and in the scope of their activities." 14 Closure, as
the British charge d'affaires put it, was in order, although the
firms still hoped to perform a useful service in the interests of
Sino-British trade, the proper machinery for which, as the note
went on to suggest, should be established.
All of Britain's Diplomatic Notes, including a third one in
November, 1952, sought a quick resolution of the difficulties
facing British firms. But the British would offer nothing in return,
not even relaxation of the trade embargo. Theoretically, British
options were many. They varied from publicity through "planted"
articles in Western newspapers, to cutting off remittances, to
closing Chinese banks in London or Signapore, to halting the
purchase of Chinese exports or even to the withdrawal of the
British Charge d'affaires. In fact, there was little that Britain
could do to facilitate a rapid withdrawal. The steps Britain might
have taken probably would have produced only a "mounting
spiral of reciprocal brutality," a "game" which Humphrey
Trevelyan, British Charge d'affaires to the People's Government
from 1953 to 1955, pointed out later "we were unlikely to win." 15
The British Notes then could be little more than pleas for mercy.
The People's Government replied to the British Notes in
July. 16 As expected by the firms, the reply did not help them.
Chang Han-fu, responding on behalf of the People's Government
asserted that "the predicament of the British firms in China was
14. Cf. 12. The third note was merely a reminder to the Chinese that British
firms were having difficulties and a further plea to help ease those troubles.
15. Humphrey Trevelyan, Worlds Apart: China 1953_55, Soviet Union 1962_5
(London: MacMillan, 1971), p. 59.
16. Cf. 12.
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the bitter fruit of the policy of trade control and embargo of the
British Government ... by following the U.S. Government in
carrying out the trade control and embargo." Chang Han-fu
argued, "the British Government had not only contravened but
also jeopardized the interests of the British people. 1'
Because of what the Chinese viewed as the British Government's official hostility, the People's Government refused to
establish full diplomatic relations with Britain. Relatedly, Peking
was not prepared to discuss closure for British firms with the
British government. Instead of dealing with the matter of British
interests in China with the British government, the Chinese
preferred to respond directly to approaches from the British firms
involved.
The third party involved, China, did not object on principle to
taking over British industrial assets. Yet Chinese terms were
expected to be hard, partly in response to the historic policies of
imperialism employed by Britain against China. More immediately, in 1952, China feared increasing diplomatic isolation from
the West. The U.S. Navy, for example, was pressing for a blockade
of the entire China Coast. As a matter of prudence, the Chinese
therefore tried to prevent isolation by holding hostage the various
British firms which while being restrained from closing, would be
certain to exercise their influence on the British government
against such a blockade.
When the Chinese government was prepared to allow the
firms to leave, the terms were expected to be difficult. Nobody
doubted this since early signs all pointed in that direction. Among
them were the demands made on a number of leading British
firms by trade unions in Tientsin. These demands, which the
Chinese government required to be accepted before serious
discussion of closure could even take place, included: (1) one and
one-third months of regular wages per year of service as severance
pay to Chinese workers; (2) six months wages for termination of
employment; (3) six months salary as discharge fee owing to
closure of business: and (4) a home-leave travel allowance equal to
ten percent of the discharge fee.
Given the difficulties in Tientsin and the likely troubles with
closure applications to follow in Shanghai, one British firm's
directors decided to try to negotiate closure on the basis of the
firm's holdings, with the greatest liabilities to be negotiated first.
The parent firm basically involved itself in the export-import
trade as well as the general managerships of several subsidiary
companies. With little foreign trade taking place, the firm's
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directors decided to make a case for closure on the basis of its
assets in various property holdings against accumulating liabilities (as viewed by the firm) due to the difficulty of doing any
export-import business.
As a shipping enterprise at a time of little or no actual
shipping business, this firm's monthly overhead of the People's
Dollar equivalent of $US 20,000 in workers' wages made it
necessary for the firm to bring in remittances from Hong Kong,
totaling $US 400,000 in Hong Kong Dollars in 1951. Not
surprisingly, the firm's directors were anxious to cease operations.
The firm's representatives went to the Shanghai Foreign Affairs
Bureau on September 9, 1952 with estimates of assets and
liabilities to begin closure negotiations.
A big discrepancy between assets and liabilities on the side of
assets was intentional. The big discrepancy was desirable as
others wishing to add to the firm's liabilities and to question the
total of its assets were expected to be less inclined to bother if the
assets total were sufficiently large. Assets were listed to be the
RMP equivalent of $US 1,500,000 based on a recent Shanghai
Realty Guide Association valuation of the firm's principle land
and buildings. Liabilities were figured to be the RMP equivalent of
$US 250,000.17
The Chinese authorities expressed little interest in the
favorable reports of the firm's own balance sheet's assets and
liabilities; the separation of various assets was merely legalistic.
The Chinese saw through the disingenuous tactic of trying to
close the parent firm before closing the associated firms. As
Managing Agents with Power of Attorney for various subsidiary
companies, the parent firm, Chinese authorities reasoned, would
not be eligible for closure until the accounts of various subsidiary
companies were first settled. In short, the Chinese, and not the
British firm, decided in what order the firm's holdings would be
liquidated. The order that would be used would reflect China's
interest, and not the firm's.
Pursuant to the Chinese decision that the parent firm could
only follow closure of the subsidiary firms, parent firm executives
then focused their attention on the two companies, which had the
two largest deficit accounts, and on another subsidiary as well.
One subsidiary was in crisis, in the view of the firm's executives,
especially because of the average monthly clinic and medical
expenses for its nearly 200 workers. Because of new Chinese
regulations, in 1952, the average monthly expenses for medical
care had risen from the previous year's average of $US 250 in
L7. Confidential Document, Shanghai, September 7, 1952.
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RMP to the RMP equivalent of $US 2,000. In the case of a
different subsidiary, liabilities in November 1952, according to the
finn's records, had become forty-five percent of the estimated
assets based on a 1946 valuation. The valuation of various
shipping industry assets, Chinese authorities argued, was now
figured too high because of poor business conditions, negligence in
maintenance and the inability of the parent firm to find a Chinese
finn interested in buying.
These early negotiations concerning closure of a leading
British finn's assets reflect and epitomize the historic turnabout of
the foreign business environment in China created by the Chinese
Communist Revolution. The exchanges between a firm's executives and Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau officials, for example,
are archetypal. They show the confrontation between different
interests, social systems and world views as well as the inability
of the weaker party, here, the British firm, to assert itself
forcefully in that confrontation. The historic shift in relative
power allowed the Chinese to collect from British firms a part of
what they viewed as an historic debt for past exploitation.
A typical example of this confrontation is incorporated in the
following deadpan conversation between a British business
executive and a Chinese official in November 1952:
British business executive:
The reason why our bottling company has to cease
production is not because of a shortage of resources. There is
pelnty of material to carry on more production, but continued
production without sales would only mean spoiling and
throwing away the stock. Our accumulated stock right now is
more than the amount sold in the past eight months . . . The
right to sell beverages has been taken away from the
management because it is impossible for a bottling company
under foreign management to compete with governmentoperated bottling companies whose sale is being pushed
everywhere in Shanghai to the detriment of (our) firm's. If
our company were taken over by the Government it would be
operated at a profit, because the bottling company's plant
and machinery are the most up-to-date but (they are) a dead
loss under foreign management.
Chinese official:
The question of who is to operate the bottling company will
be decided by the authorities concerned, but until that
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question is decided (the parent firm) should be responsible for
the operation, production and the workers' welfare.
British business executive:
(The firm) will, of course, do their best to manage the bottling
company, but (the firm) cannot be responsible for lending
money to the bottling company.
Chinese official:
I have not said anything about the parent firm lending
money to the bottling company. I said the parent firm should
be responsible. Whether or not you lend money is for you to
decide.
British business executive:
(The parent firm) will certainly do their best. I just want the
Bureau to understand and appreciate the extreme difficulty
the bottling company is in, and ask the government to assist
the company by expediting a closure decision.
Chinese official:
Yes, until the government has made its decision (the parent
firm) should be responsible. If anything happens affecting
bottling production and staff welfare, or anything in
contravention to Government regulations, (the parent firm)
will be held responsible.
British business executive:
I assure you (the parent firm) will do their best and (the
parent firm) has never intentionally done anything in
violation of government laws and regulations. Incidently,
may I know what the Comrade had in mind when he
mentioned "in contravention to government regulations?"
Chinese official:
You must know what things are within the law and what not
without my telling you anything. You know, of course, that
foreign enterprises operating in China must do everything in
accordance with Chinese law.
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British business executive:
Oh, yes, of course I understand that. Rest assured (the parent
firm) has never intentionally done anything to violate the

government law, neither wil-l it do so in the future.
Chinese official:
Anything more to say?
British business executive:
That is all, thank you, but I do appeal to the Comrade to do
what he can to expedite a decision on these important
matters. His assistance would be greatly appreciated.
Chinese official:
(nodded)
A similar exchange between a British business executive from
a shipping firm and a Chinese Foreign Affairs official illustrates
the same historic turnabout in business dealings in China. Unlike
in the past, when the British firm's major concern in China had
been to earn profits to be remitted to London, the demands of ·
hostage capitalism now necessitated that the company's highest
priority be meeting the labor union's demands for better health
care, even if that meant providing imported medicines to workers.
In the new context, the firm had little recourse but to abide by
Chinese rules and regulations as they were emphasized in the
following discussion. The Chinese official's simple, straightforward language underscores China's awareness that it had
attained the superior position during all closure negotiations.
Chinese official:
Until your application for closure is approved by the
Government you must continue to maintain the livelihood of
your employees. And it is our opinion you should continue to
do business, and curtail your expenditure at the same time.
Open up the sources and check the flow, as we say.
British business executive:
I quite understand all of this but doing business is
practically impossible and our unions make it difficult to
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reduce expenditure. The heavy drain caused by the Clinic
and Medical Expenses is a reason. The management has no
control over these expenses which are entirely at the mercy
of the Union. We have recently appealed to the Union to cut
down on medical expenses but have gotten nowhere. The
majority of the patients demand imported medicines although they know there are locally made medicines just as
good and costing only a fraction of the expensive imports,
which must be bought with foreign exchange.
Chinese official:
If the expenditure is beneficial to the health of your
employees you have to spend the money.

British business executive:
And the Tax Bureau says we must pay income tax. We lost a
lot of money last year and the year before. The tax officer,
Comrade Wu, has frequently visited our firm and knows all
our profit and loss situation; but the Tax Bureau recently has
said we must pay Income Tax on an estimated basis for 1952.
Chinese official:
How much is your income tax? Have you received your
demand notice?
British business executive:
We were told a week ago that we were to be assessed (the
RMP equivalent of $US 11,000). I went to the Tax Bureau
and protested strongly and I hear the amount has been
reduced to between the (RMP equivalent of $US 2,000 and
$US 3,000). But even this is too much to a firm that lost a
great deal of money last year; there should be no income tax
on losses; we have not yet received the demand notice. I
understand that it will be sent to us next week.
Chinese official:
The Tax Bureau does things in accordance with government
regulations. They make an estimate according to the general
conditions of a trade, fix a sum to be assessed, and collect in
advance. Then the Tax Bureau will inspect your books, and if
they find you have lost money, they will refund the money
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collected, or require you to make up more if your books prove
you have made a profit and have paid less than you should.
British business executive:
Yes, I understand . . .
During these discussions between British business executives
and Chinese officials the central issue was not yet the actual
terms of the firm's closure, but whether or not the firm presently
would be considered eligible to make the application for closure.
The negotiations for closure would have to come later. This
unhappy situation for British businessmen made any consideration given by Chinese authorities to their business difficulties
appear as a hopeful sign. 18 Therefore, when the Chinese gave a
British-owned bottling company permission in November to
dispose of surplus equipment and, at the same time, purchased
1,500 cases of various beverages, the firm's directors took comfort
in at least being able to meet the rest of the year's wage bills
without bringing into China any more hard currency. The
continuing difficulties of the various firms in Shanghai, not to
mention similar problems among British shipping offices in other
Chinese cities, did not, however, foster bright expectations. If
nothing else, the firms hoped that when closure ~ventually did
take place, a much discussed trade relationship with China from
abroad, rather than inside China, would permit continued profit
making.
The future, however, was tied to the present. To realize
expectations of future trade relationships with China, the various
British firms felt that they had first to allay Chinese fears that
closure and withdrawal were part of a plan to further retaliate
against China for its involvement in Korea. This is why Leo
Lamb in his Diplomatic Note of May 19 stated that "while
existing machinery is not appropriate to present-day needs, the
firms feel that they can still perform a useful service in the
interests of Sino-British trade." 19
18. Virtually all China Association memoranda for 1952 suggest possible link
between closure and future trade. For general discussions of these issues see Evan
Luard, Britain and China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962),
Robert Boardman, Britain and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1974 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1976), and Brian Porter, Britain and the Rise of
Communist China (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
19. China Association, H.J. Collar, for "China Affairs Committee HK," to Leo
Lamb, May 15, 1952.
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To this end, the possible establishment of a trade association
to stay on in China after all closures was a continuing topic of
discussion among British businessmen in the fall and winter of
1952. Two alternative proposals were discussed. One was for a
loose association of representatives who, with Peking's approval,
would act as contract men in Peking to keep British manufactures
abreast of Chinese trade developments, but who would not accept
responsibilities for the behavior of individual manufactures in
Hong Kong or London. The other was for a trading company
which would act as an agent for British importers and exporters.
For two reasons the prevailing view throughout 1952 favored the
former.
First, because individual firms and their human agents were
in difficult straits, in part because of taxes and tax fines, no
British China firm wanted to assign to an agent in China any
business that might attract Chinese tax liabilities. The firms
wanted to close down and avoid such troublesome responsibilities
in the future. A trade company in China therefore was contradictory to the single most important goal of the various British firms
getting out of China.
Second, a loose association was favored because of the
different preferences for closure and future trade among individual firms. The easiest way to make a consensus proposal to the
People's Government was to let the association start with the
most flexible terms of reference and try to solve its problems as
they arose.
The firms agreed, however, that merely raising the issue of
future Sino-British trade with Chinese authorities might help their
negotiations for closure. A possible bargaining chip for the firms
with the Chinese, which was never played, was to propose the
establishment of a trade association with the precondition that a
Peking-approved closure of direct investments precede its operation.
Nobody knew in mid-June, 1952 what the Chinese reaction to
a trade association proposal would be. When an outline of the
proposal was finally presented to the Shanghai Foreign Affairs
Bureau in late summer 1952, the Chinese quickly announced their
position that such a trade mission should be established prior to
the various firms' withdrawal from China.
The Chinese were in no hurry to ease closure for the firms.
Nor did they accept responsibility as the exclusive or prime source
for the firms' difficulties. The Chinese blamed strategic trade
regulations enforced by the British government for much of the
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difficulties of the various British firms. Not only did the People's
Government feel that the British government's position was one
of hostility towards the new People's Government but in addition,
that many of the traditional British firms were psychologically
incapable of accepting the Chinese Communist Revolution and
were seeking excess profits "as if China were still the old corrupt
foreign colony."20
Because of these various problems associated with the old
China firms, China saw the possibility of doing business with
other, more sympathetic British firms. When China sent delegates
. to the Moscow Economic Conference in April, 1952, they ignored
the old-China-hand British firms by signing agreements with a
British delegation of assorted British businessmen and left-wing
politicians for $US 28 million. 21 None of the traditional British
firms were represented. As a result the old firms feared their
complete exclusion from future Sino-British trade. China's
establishment of major trade offices in East Berlin and rumors
that China planned completely to circumvent Hong Kong for
trade with the West exacerbated these fears.
British firms continued throughout 1952 to find themselves
caught in the difficult confrontation and transition of the initial
Cold War Period. As business in China grew less and less
profitable during China's "San-Fan" "Wu-Fan" campaigns, the
British firms, which in the previous era had been able to do much
as they pleased, now wanted to cease operations and withdraw
from China. China, however, was not willing to simply approve
their applications for closure. In these difficult times the firms
hoped at least in the future to play an important role in SinoBritish trade from their home bases of Hong Kong or London. But
even that prospect appeared increasingly dim· as China increasingly showed signs of preferring to exclude the old British China
firms from future China trade.
China now was calling all the shots, signalling to British
firms possible future problems. The British government, as a
world power and the once military backbone of imperialism in
China, was, like the old China firms it had once fought for, now a
lingering remnant of an era the Chinese Communists were
helping to put to rest.
20. See South China Morning Post, May 6, 1952.
21. Boardm~n, op Cit.
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Chapter IV
BETWEEN TWO ERAS: THE OLD AND NEW BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENTS IN CHINA
A. The Process and Terms of
Closure
B. After Closure: Trading with
China
As British firms and China moved between two eras in their
relations, China's control of its economy became more clear than
ever before as hostage capitalism came to an end in summer 1954.
The "hope and wait and see" attitude at the time of the Chinese
Communist takeover changed to hopelessness and desperation in
early 1953. Although generally speaking British firms decided to
cease operations and to withdraw from China in early 1952, only
in· early 1953 did the various firms realize how expensive, in the
firms view, closure was to be, yet after the firms closure and
withdrawal from China, many of which came in 1954, the firms'
relations with China did not end. They simply changed. 1
In a desperate effort to gain permission of the People's
Government to withdraw from China, a leading British firm
agreed in January, 1953 to negotiate its assets against liabilities
for a complete Chinese takeover of the firm's China operations.
Disputes over the value of these assets and liabilities reflected the
different parties' interests and prolonged the negotiations. The
firm tried to speed up the slow, espensive process by a variety of
means. A trip to Peking by a British taipan was even considered
"with the sole object of saying to Chang Han-fu (China's Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs), 'How much money will China take to
allow (the firm) to close down immediately?'"
The problem was that the various firms' directors were tired of
remitting funds from Hong Kong while they waited passively and
hoped for closure applications to be approved and :;he terms of
final agreements for closure to be settled. The Chinese, however,
were not to be rushed into approving closure applications or
settling the terms of closure until they, and not the firms, were
ready to do so.
"As to giving you the Government's decision in a short
time," a Shanghai Foreign Affairs Bureau official told a
1. Confidential document. Shanghai, May 18, 195a.
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British business executive, "please ·remember (that) this
bureau has repeatedly said to you that as (your firm) has
been in China for years and years and in consequence has a
larger number of problems, it will take the Government some
time to study (your application) . . . (you) cannot expect a
defmite answer in a short time." 2
Chinese officials reminded British executives that the People's
Government had never said "no" to the firm's application for
closure.
China's "yes" in response to British firms' closure application, however, only came gradually. Many subsidiary firms were
taken over by China soon after the Korean Armistice in July,
1953. As a reflection of the general improvement in Sino-British
relations, the closure agreement for one leading parent firm was
finally negotiated in summer 1954, several months after the April
Geneva Conference. Final closure agreements cannot be attributed solely to the Geneva Conference. Concurrently, China's
entire economy was being nationalized. By mid-1954 that process
was in its advanced stages.
After several of the British firms' withdrew from China, their
relationship with China continued on a new basis as they played
a major role in developing Sino-British trade relations. From
Hong Kong the firms traded with China without the direct
investment and involvement in China's economy which marked
the pre-Communist era in China. This current remodeled relationship between the firms and China apparently has proved to be
mutually acceptable.
A.

The Process and Terms of Closure

Even at the expense of abandoning assets in China, British
firms only hoped in the spring of 1953 to be able to negotiate a
withdrawal from China. One British firm had already remitted to
China the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent of $US 2,000,000 with no
prospect of improved business conditions. In order to meet
continuing overhead, the firm tried wherever possible to raise
local funds from the sale of unnecessary machinery, for example,
a few trucks and accounting machines. But these sales had to be
approved by the People's Government, which instead preferred
that the firm remit foreign currency. The firm increasingly was
desperate to close, if only to cut off remittances to China.
2. Confidential document, Shanghai, April 5, 1953.
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In the firm's view the continuing need to remit from Hong
Kong led them to propose the formula of offsetting assets against
liabilities as a basis for permission to withdraw from China.
Using the 1942 British Shanghai Realty Guide to calculate the
firm's assets, the firm's managers in their own interest attempted
to extract themselves from China in the least painful manner.
While the firm used the Realty Guide's terms of the past era to
carry the firm into the present transitional era, the Chinese
rejected what they saw in this method as a continuing attempt on
the firm's part to assert imperialist prerogatives. The Chinese
pointed out that, unlike in 1942, the firm's assets now had no
value since there were no potential buyers. Without a capitalist
environment they were no longer profitmaking concerns.
The unprofitability of the firm's assets was a primary reason
given for China's rejection of the firm's calculations of its assets
and liabilities. A second reason for China's rejection of the firm's
efforts to cease operations arose when China challenged whether
the firm even owned what were claimed as assets because of the
manner in which they were acquired or because of other liabilities
unrecognized by the firm. On the basis of one British firm's
unprofitability, for example, the People's Government argued that
it would have a difficult time in helping the parent firm find a
private Chinese firm willing to take over the firm's responsibilities
due to the unhealthy state of the subsidiary company. A Chinese
government takeover was considered an impossibility, too.
When China agreed to discuss the terms of closure for the
various British firms, disputes inevitably arose over the basis for
the firm's calculations of assets and liabilities. In the case of a
British Sottling company, China argued that in 1945 the bottling
company had illegally taken over significant Japanese materials
and stocks. The parent firm could not prove the asserted
legitimacy of the acquisitions because it had no record that the
takeover was ever processed through the Chinese Alien Property
Department. There were more mundane disputes and problems to
be settled as well. A Chinese "takeover" firm insisted, for
example, that as a condition for the Chinese takeover, the British
firm provided the Chinese firm with blueprints of the bottling
plant. They could not be located.
Illegally acquired assets was not the only problem for
negotiating British firms' closure and withdrawal from China. As
a final condition for the Chinese takeover of a British firm's
shipping agency in Tientsin, the People's Government required
that all contracts made up to the time of closure must be exactly
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performed. But performance was made difficult by the British
trade embargo against China, illustrated in the contract between
the British firm and the China N aitonal Import and Export
Corporation, made prior to the time of closure negotiations, for the
installation of a boiler to be used at a hydroelectric plant near
Tientsin. Performance of the 1950 contract required that the
British firm provide thirty-eight cast and forged steel valves that
were only available from the highly industrialized countries of the
world, such as Britain. The problem in 1953 was that these valves
were included on the British government's embargo list for trade
with China. The British firm claimed that liability for nonperformance of the contract was precluded by force majeure clauses in
the original contract. The Chinese disagreed by insisting that it
was simple misfortune for the firm to have to share in some of the
hardship created by Britain's policy of attempting to economically
strangle China. As a consequence of the exact performance policy,
China's Steel and Iron Administration threatened to sue the
British firm for nonperformance of the contract. In computing
their claim for damages, the British firm's relevant internal
memorandum notes,
"the Chinese had it worked out that if the boiler had been
delivered on time . . . (and) had been erected immediately
they could have produced so many millions of kilowatts
between then and January (1954), amounting to a fantastic
figure, some RMP 117 million (or $US 5,000) per day, which
had been lost to the country and for which they intended to
make a claim."3
Faced with the possibility of this enormous claim, the British firm
and the British Charge d'affaires in China lobbied successfully for
the British government's approval of the necessary export licenses
for the valves. The Chinese threat of making a claim was
withdrawn when the valves' license was approved by the British
government in June, 1953.
China's firmness in ·enforcing various measures, such as
insisting contracts be exactly performed, prolonged hostage
capitalism and raised the levels of frustration and impatience
among British firms whose influence was ending. The firm
experienced losses throughout 1953, and the firm's directors often
described prospects for closure as "disappointing," a "deadlock,"
or "dreary as a funeral." Once more, in early 1953, the firm
3. Confidential document, Shanghai, April 8, 1953.
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considered cutting off remittances from Hong Kong but the idea
was vetoed for fear of a negative effect on the twin goals of
quickly withdrawing from China and trading from abroad
afterwards. Months later, in an effort to speed up what the firm's
directors thought was an inevitable closure, the British government sent the Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau another note
seeking "renewed assistance in causing instructions to be issued
so that facilities may be given to British firms to close at an early
date." In the same vein, a British taipan even appealed directly to
Prime Minister Chou En-lai in a telegram. A follow-up letter,
which apparently was never answered, suggested the possibility
that he might visit Chou in Peking to settle all outstanding
matters for withdrawal.
Limited settlement of British firms' closure was made possible
by the easing of tensions between China and Britain as the
Korean Armistice in July, 1953 drew near. 4 It was only after the
Korean Armistice that China appeared willing to complete closure
negotiations. The protracted negotiations for the withdrawal of
the parent firms were partially eased by the Geneva Conference of
April, 1954 which resulted in generally improved Sino-British
relations. Coincidentally China was moving quickly in 1953 and
1954 to completely socialize its economy; too much significance
could not be attached to the Korean Armistice or to Geneva as an
explanation for the end of hostage capitalism. 5
After the Korean Armistice, negotiations for the closure of
British firms in China progressed steadily. In the case of a British
bottling company, a Chinese takeover was finalized in late 1953.
Another British firm reached a settlement with the China Ocean
Shipping Agency in mid-December, 1953 when the British firm
agreed to a cash payment of the Hong Kong Dollar equivalent of
$US 37,000 towards unpaid taxes and fines accumulated on
unpaid taxes.
The progress towards closure did not always immediately
include the British parent firms. The parent firms' closure was
settled only after the Geneva Conference in April, 1954. It was
during the Geneva Conference that Anthony Eden, Britain's
4. See, generally Evan Luard, Op. Cit., and Robert Boardman, Op. Cit.
5. On the trend towards a completely socialized economy see George Ecklund,
"Protracted Expropriation of Private Business in China," Pacific Affairs, Fall,
1961, p. 244. The percentage of total industrial production in 1954 was 19.9':1,; for
1955, 13%; for 1956, nil. The percentage of total wholesalE' trade in 1954 was 10%;
for 19.'i.'J, 4.,;,; for 19.'i6, nil. The percentage of total retail trade for 1954 was 26.5%;
for 1955, 8";,; for 1956, 2.9'ci ..
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Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and China's Prime Minister Chou
En-lai discussed a number of questions affecting relations
between Britain and China, including the difficulties of British
firms in China.
As a result of the Geneva talks between Eden and Chou, a
Chinese diplomatic mission was established in London under a
Charge d'affaires, corresponding to the British post in Peking. In
a brief period of near cordiality between Britain and China, Prime
Minister Chou En-lai agreed personally to look into sources of
conflict between China and Britain, including the closure of the
British firms. As if to emphasize China's interest in improved
relations with Britain, a month after the Geneva Conference
ended, when a British civil aircraft was shot down by Chinese
aircraft with the loss of ten lives, the Chinese government
surprised the world by publishing an immediate apology and
paying in full the claim for compensation subsequently sought
.
(requested) by the British government:6
How much this brief detente in Sino British relations helped
British firms is difficult to ascertain without access to Chinese
sources. Even after Geneva, British businessmen discovered that
the assets-for-liabilities formula, as it was envisioned by the firms'
directors, did not easily work.
"Eventually it will boil down, I suppose, to the price-cash
payment the Chinese will want from the firm to be allowed to
close the doors,"
a British businessman predicted. 7
The difference between the two parties were not simply issues
involving extortion. As with any liquidation scheme a number of
issues were raised in British firms' closure in China. Unlike in the
past, however, China's superior bargaining position dictated
inevitable closure terms which were unacceptable to the firm.
China was sympathetic to its workers' needs and not to British
staffs needs.
It is on the basis of China's sympathies that the cash
payment which one British firm was required to make appears to
have been justified. During the negotiations for the closure of a
particular British firm in early 1954, for example, thirty-one of the
6. "Chang Han-fu Answers Trevelyan in Case of British Aircraft," NCNAEnglish Peking (July 26, 1964), in SCMP, No. 856:1 (July 27, 1954), reprinted with
discussion in Cohen and Chiu (eds.), Op. Cit., pp. 740-71.
7. Confidential document, Shanghai, December 30, 1953.
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firm's seventy-three remaining Chinese employees who were
qualified under an agreement of February 1950, decided to retire.
Under this agreement they were entitled to certain pay. If only
thirty-one employees decided to retire the cost would have been the
Chinese equivalent of $US 70,000. If all seventy-three qualified
workers wished to retire, which the British firm feared might be
the case, the firm's directors calculated the cost of the retirement
would be the RMP equivalent of $US 100,000. The firm argued
that in effect the Chinese authorities would be taking over all of
the firm's assets and only a portion of the liabilities in requiring
that the firm provide the funds for the retirement of these workers.
The Chinese did not agree, and the firm was required to remit the
HK dollar equivalent of $US 60,000 as a final settlement of the
matter.
China's insistence that employment agreements with this
British firm strictly be adhered in one particular case affected two
of the firm's British employees. During the closure negotiations
two members of the British staff made applications for retirement.
If approved, this would have required that the firm provide six
months' pay in addition to a pension for life. The Chinese
authorities, however, insisted that the firm's employment agreements indicated that employees were only entitled to these
circumstances under specific circumstances, which had not been
met. For example, an employee was entitled to six months' leave
only after completing forty-two months' service. Neither employee
had fulfilled this obligation. Further, according to the agreements,
an employee was eligible for pension only after completing fifteen
years of service and attaining forty-five years of age. One
employee was fifty-two, while the other was forty-one.
The firm argued that since closure was a special circumstance, even if these men did not exactly fulfill the terms of the
employment agreements, they should be allowed pension benefits.
The Chinese, in contrast, argued that the agreements provided the
relevant standards for deciding the issue and, based upon them,
the two men were not entitled to these benefits. As a result, if the
two men were to retire, funds for this, according to Chinese
authorities, should come not from the British firm's China
operations in the form of a remittance from China, but instead
from the firm's reserves held abroad. The Chinese apparently saw
the entire matter as a disguised remittance abroad from the firm's
China accounts.
China's rejection of disguised remittances reflected the
country's determination to retain as much as possible of British
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firms' China-based assets. A dispute which focused on transportation provisions from China to England for the two British
employees mentioned previously also illustrates that determination. A British negotiator insisted that they should travel by first
class since managers always traveled by first class.
The Chinese official replied:
"We cannot find any provision to that effect."
British firm's negotiator:
"Can you find any provision that they should travel by
second class?"
The Chinese official (pointing to a paragraph in an agreement):
"here is the provision."
British firm's negotiator:
"This agreement is a dead one. It expired in 1942."
Chinese official:
"They came by second class."
British firm's negotiator:
"There are some precedents that foreign staff were allowed to
travel by first class."
Chinese official:
"We have noted such precedents. But they were deviations
from the regulations."
How the British employees returned to England is not recorded!
in this British firm's records. It would be surprising, however, if
they returned to England by first class transportation from the
firm's China accounts. More likely, the firm's Hong Kong office
made up the difference between first and second class transportation.
Once these and other issues were settled between British firms
and China, a settlement could be reached for the closure of the
firm's China operations. By summer, 1954, a complete settlement
was made with several of the leading British firms whereby China
simply took over the firm's remaining responsibilities in exchange
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for the firm's various assets. Apparently the British firms in turn
received no compensation. Typically when the Shanghai assets
were turned over to China the firms' assets in various China
outports, Hankow, Swatow, Foochow, Tsingtao, and Canton, for
example, were similtaneously relinquished as well. Most of the
outport agencies had managed to avoid building up great
liabilities by using the revenue from renting their properties to
meet overhead. For purposes of closure the only liability usually
involved in close agreements was the pay-off of Chinese workers
in accordance with the firms' employment agreements. In
Foochow, which would not seem to be unrepresentative of the
other outports, this amounted for one British firm to a remittance
in Hong Kong Dollars of $US 11,000 before closure was agreed to
by all of the parties.
As the closure of one British firm's China operations reached
its final stages in the summer of 1954, all foreign personnel
previously employed by the firm were gradually given exit permits
to leave China.
In the new environment which evolved after the Chinese
Communists took over, firms like Swires, the Hong Kong
Shanghai Bank and Shell, among others, had been caught in the
process by which China used its inherited forces of production to
transform its economy into a socialist one. Some of these firms'
directors hoped that as part of this transformation a new mode of
doing business might be acceptable to the Chinese government.
With the firms' still sizable reserve held abroad, their directors
hoped to rebuild the firms from outside China as import-export
firms for the China trade. After establishing a new base of
operations in Hong Kong they applied for permission to set up
trading correspondent's offices in Peking. The request was denied,
but as it turned out this denial had little effect on the firm's later
development as a China traders and as dominant firms in the
Pacific region as well.
B.

After Closure: Trading with China

As a reaction to the favorable foreign business environment of
pre-Communist China past, the People's Government trade policy
has been repeatedly stated: "China is willing to restore and
develop international trade relations with governments and
peoples of other countries, on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit."H During the years of hostage capitalism and the years
t<. One example, among many, of this position is "Statement by the Chinese
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chang Han-fu, on British Trade ·with China,
July 5, 1952" in Cohen and Chiu (eds.), Op. Cit .. p. 698.
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that followed, China has used its power and influence with British
firms to defend itself against discriminatory trade policies
reminiscent of the previous era. In the process these firms have
played key roles in developing a new era's trading institutions.
Throughout the years of hostage capitalism the Chinese
insisted that the root cause of Sino-British trade difficulties was
Britain's trade restrictions on the export of various goods to
China, which increased the difficulties of British firms in China
and affected China's import and export trade with Britain. The
Chinese rather explicitly argued that, "(t)he predicament of the
British firms in China (was) the bitter fruit of the policy of trade
control and embargo of the British government." 9 Taken literally,
the Chinese seem to have argued that without British trade
controls and the embargo, the terms for other British firms'
withdrawal from China might have been easier. To what degree
the terms would have been easier for the firms is impossible to
know.
One indication that the British firms would have had an
easier time of hostage capitalism was the Chinese reaction to
restrictive trade policies. China redirected as much of the SinoBritish trade as was possible away from the traditional China
firms into entirely new British channels. 1° China sought to deal
directly with manufacturers in Britain, even though early efforts
do not appear to have been fruitful. More significantly, until1954,
China tried to conduct negotiations in trade matters with Britain
only through the exclusive means of various politically sympathetic organizations. Prior to 1954, for example, China's trade
offices in East Berlin often dealt with British businessmen only if
they were acting under the auspices of the British Council for the
Promotion of International Trade, or later, the London Export
Corporation.
Neither the old British China firms nor the British government was happy with this arrangement. If they could no longer
invest in China the old China firms wanted at least to trade with
China. Some firms involved in hostage capitalism even counted
on this possibility as a kind of compensation for enduring the
difficult terms of withdrawal from China. The British Government believed that, in contrast to the new "fellow-traveler" firms,
the older British China firms would be more likely to co-operate in
following British Government trade policies. In November, 1953,
the British Government declared the British Council for the
9. Ibid., p. 699.
10. Cf. 1.
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Promotion of International Trade to be a Communist-front
organization and warned British businessmen against taking part
in its activities. In November, 1955, the British Government
reminded the British Parliament that the decision to use the
British Council for the Promotion of International Trade was a
matter. for the "patriotic judgment of each British firm or
individual." 11
In the cordial mood of official Sino-British relations at
Geneva in July, 1954, British Government officials made a
strenuous effort to persuade the Chinese Government to redirect
trade between Britain and China into more traditional channels.
The effort was successful; as the Chinese authorities openly
declared their willingness to deal with the old British China firms.
As a result, in June, 1954, a new semi-official British China trade
organization, the Sino-British Trade Committee (later council),
came into being. This new organization had no imperialist history
with which it could be associated; although it represented the
China Association, the Federation of British Industries, the
National Union of Manufacturers, the London Chambers of
Commerce, and the Association of British Chambers of Commerce. In behalf of these member organizations the Sino-British
Trade Committee invited a Chinese mission to Britain in late June
and early July, 1954. China accepted. 12
At these meetings, which were a kind of courtship between
British commercial interests and China, the former successfully
promoted a Sino-British policy which provided that trade with the
latter should be channeled through an organization that was
acceptable to traditional British China interests. The leading
Chinese official at the meetings even expressed his pleasure that
the British delegation included a number of old China firms which
were represented and whose experience in the China trade was of
much value in China. Relatedly, the Chinese expressed a new
flexibility in dealing with merchants instead of manufacturers.
Major British "China firms" enthusiastically welcomed this new
development.
China's leaders evidently realized that the old British China
firms could play a valuable role in helping to develop Sino-British
trade. China desired trade with the West, so the older China firms'
reputation within the West as dependable importer-expqrters was
useful. Without an international sales network of its own, China
must have realized the precarious status of organizations like the
11. Evan Luard, Op. Cit .. p. 129.
12. Ibid.
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British Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Trading
with such organizations was no way to improve official SinoBritish relations. It was the same firms which China had
nationalized domestically, which China had to cooperate with for
the sale of China's products abroad. They provided China access
to Sterling deposits, insurance headquarters, and commodity
market centers.l3 Because of their size and experience with these
matters in the China trade, firms like Swires and Jardine
Matheson in Hong Kong, were especially suited to China's needs.
A Chinese official expressed China's new flexibility this way:
As to the question whether a merchant or a manufacturer is
preferred (by China), an experienced businessman would
never affirm this before negotiations start. Generally
speaking, it seems that trade with manufacturers are more
direct and convenient than dealing with merchants. However
. . . a merchant sometimes acts as a good bridge between
buyer and seller in cases where buying and selling terms
differ. Sometimes it is also possible that merchants are in a
position to offer more favorable terms than the manufacturer. China's foreign trade organizations do not oppose the
possibilities that the merchants can under certain conditions
offer their services to both buyers and sellers. 14
Although no specific contracts were negotiated in the summer
of 1954, on the basis of statements like these by Chinese officials,
British businessmen from the older China firms viewed the
discussions to have been a great success. A return trip to China by
British merchants who were affiliated with the Sino-British Trade
Council met with progress on the trying question of payments,
which were made difficult by the Korean War. China agreed to
payments by irrevocable letters of credit instead of by letters of
guarantee, and to adopt other adjustments to earlier trade
requirements.
Major difficulties between Britain and China continued after
the brief detente brought on by the Geneva Conference. Britain
did not unilaterally relax controls on the China trade until 1957.
This irritated China. Concurrently, it was not until_1957 that the
last British firm, Patons and Baldwins, was allowed to cease
operations and withdraw from China.
13. Edward Friedman, "The International Political Economy and Chinese
Politics," Stanford Journal of International Studies X, Spring 1975, p. 6.
14. Confidential document, London, August 2, 1954.
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After the relaxation of the British embargo in 1957 an
intensive trade drive was conducted by British exporters. "A large
British motor manufacturer," writes Evan Luard, "placed a
quarter-page advertisement in the People's Daily six times the size
of any normal advertisement in that paper." 1·" In a different era
perhaps these advertisements would have helped to penetrate the
China market.
Although in the aggregate Sino-British trade has been
limited, for a few British firms the China trade remains very
important. Now in Hong Kong their philosophy of successful
private enterprise has remained what it has always been. "We
deal in anything we can make money at," a Jardine Matheson
director has said. 16
With major interests throughout the Pacific, Jardine Matheson as well as Swires, are more diversified than ever before. The
firms' long experience in Asia enabled them to adapt successfully
to a new business environment. Through their established
contacts with the appropriate Chinese organizations and knowledge of Chinese needs and prices, the firms have become leaders
in providing trade information, which would be prohibitively
expensive for Western firms to supply for themselves. For the
Chinese Jardine Mathesons's or Swire's knowledge, for example,
of Western markets and prices has been of great value as well.
It is on this basis that as an agent, a principal, or a
consultant, these firms sell, among other items, fertilizers,
livestock, cotton, and machine tools to China and buys back from
China 20,000 tons of rice annually, as well as soy beans, animal
and vegetable oil, hog bristles, and furs. From the selling side of
the trading relationship, the firm acts as an agent for many
British manufacturers -in Asia. In the early 1960's Jardine
Matheson helped to negotiate the sale to China of six British
turbo-prop commercial aircraft. More recently, the firm has

15. Evan Luard, p. 14.
16. See Noel Barber, "China Traders Extraordinary," The Reader's Digest,
July, 1953, p. 67; Alan Demaree, "Old China Hands Know How to Live with New
Ais," Fortune, November, 1971; Alexander Frater, "Mandarins from Dumfries·
shire," Daily Telegraph (London), October 5, 1973, pp. 58-66; Joseph Lelyveld,
"Jardine's -Where the Hong Kong Action Is," in New York Times, January 13,
1974; Vickers, da Costa and Co., Ltd., Research Group, The Swire Group: Unknown
Giant. November 1973. "An Old China Hand Readies for a New Wave of Trade,"
Business Week, May 21, 1979, pp. 108-109.
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negotiated the sale of Western drill ships and piping for the
development of China's oilY
As British firms' contemporary China trade demonstrates,
their relationship with China did not end with hostage capitalism.
It only changed. After the Geneva Conference in 1954, the
traditional British China firms began to play an active role in
developing Sino-British trade relations. From Hong Kong, British
firms have traded with China without the direct investment and
involvement in China's economy which marked the preCommunist era.
17. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), December 12, 1974.

HosTAGE CAPITALISM

IN

PERSPECTIVE

Chapter V

HOSTAGE CAPITALISM IN PERSPECTIVE
Hostage capitalism illustrates and illuminates the transition
from the relatively receptive Kuomintang era's foreign business
environment to the more hostile business environment brought on
by the Chinese Communists. After the Chinese Communist
Revolution, China's leaders were determined that China would
control its own destiny without the direct foreign influence
characteristic of the previous era. 1 This effort towards the control
of China's economy included a nationalization policy - what I
have called hostage capitalism, the success of which was
determined by the balance of political forces inside and outside
China. 2 In perspective, what stands out is the pragmatism of the
various parties to this transitional policy, which has allowed their
new relations to develop in a mutually beneficial way.
Nationalizing foreign assets often includes the risk of
retaliation by the foreign parent country if a mutually acceptable
compensation is not agreed to by both parties. In the Chinese case
Britain's weakened position in the balance of world forces lowered
the risk of retaliation when China's bargaining position allowed
the terms of nationalization to be decided solely by the Chinese.
On the one hand, hostage capitalism included the refusal of the
People's Government to permit, by any means, the closure of
industry or business of any value to the nation's economy. On the
other hand, Chinese regulations insured by way of various
measures, wage and tax policies, for example; that the firms
would cease to be profitmaking. Until closure applications were
approved by the People's Government, at least one of a firm's
senior European executives was denied an exit permit to leave
China. In order to meet obligations, and in order to even have the
possibility of having a closure application considered, the firms
had to remit funds from abroad to China. In effect, during the
nationalizing process a reverse compensation took place.
1. See, for example, Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary session of
the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," Selected
Works, Vol. IV, Op. Cit.
· 2. I do not draw any distinction among confiscation, expropriation, or
nationalization. All of these terms mean state acquisition of private foreign
property.
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Yet hostage capitalism was not simply a policy of revenge for
the historic injustices of the previous era. China's new socialist
society had to be built on the inherited foundations, that is - the
inherited relations and forces of production of the previous era.
These foundations could only gradually be transformed. Political
and economic realities meant China's leaders had to move step-bystep in the transition from an era of a foreign-dominated capitalist
urban economy to one in which China would own the means of
industrial production.
The design of this pragmatic transitional policy appears to
have been only broadly drawn in advance by China's leaders. The
timing of the transition appears to have been uncertain and had
to be worked out over the course of the policy's application in
practice. 3 Party leaders often disagreed with basic-level cadres in
implementing a dualistic industrial policy, which by definition
affected both Chinese and foreign private enterprise in China.
Over the long run the state sector was to lead, and eventually
eliminate the private sector of the economy. Thus, private
capitalists were required to accept greater restrictions, and
workers were increasingly to assume their position as a relatively
more powerful force in Chinese society. Over the short run,
however, the need to increase production and to unite with private
capitalists until their skills could be replaced, or, in the case of
native Chinese capitalists, until they could be won over, were
more inimediate needs.
, To the extent that foreign capitalists had a role to play in the
transition, the policy of hostile capitalism reflected China's strong
bargaining position with foreign firms. Although in the long run
China wanted to drive foreign capitalists out of the country, in the
short run there was every reason not to hurry the process. In the
short term, the policy of foreign hostage capitalism provided jobs
for Chinese workers who were employed to engage in production
at the firms' expense. At the same time, while China trained its
people to take over these firms, the firms were building up
liabilities which eventually would be used to offset the firms'
assets upon their withdrawal from China when the country was
ready to socialize its economy.
The difficulties of China's transition to a socialized economy,
which in any case was going to exclude foreign firms, were
exacerbated by the U.S. led policy towards China of diplomatic
isolation and economic strangulation. Britain's leaders perceived
3. See Kenneth Lieberthal, "Mao vs. Lin? Policy Towards Industry and
Commerce, 1946-1949," China Quarterly, No. 47, 1971, pp. 494-520.
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their greater post-World War II interest to lay with the U.S. and
respected much of the U.S.-designed restrictive trade policy which
British firms opposed. There is some reason to believe that had
Britain followed these policies the terms of hostage capitalism
would have been easier on the firms.
During the period of the Korean conflict, China's leaders
seldom missed an opportunity to point out that Sino-British trade
relations would greatly improve if only the British Government
would cease its restrictive policies towards China. In two specific
instances China bargained for Britain to cease acquiescing in
policies of isolation towards China. First, in the summer of 1950,
China offered a package of concessions to Britain for Britain's
approval of China's admission to the United Nations. 4 Among
these concessions was a "guarantee that no discriminatory action
would be taken against British business in China;" British
registered ships would be permitted to ply freely along the China
coast; through traffic on the Kowloon-Canton railway would be
resumed: a promise would be given not to· effect any blockage
"material or moral" of Hong Kong; and trade agreements would
be concluded with Britain on the basis of equality. 5 Second,
China's linkage of Britain's compliance with hostile policies
towards China was clear in Chang Han Fu's reply in July, 1952,
to official British Government requests for China's help in
arranging "for the transfer as going concerns, custory, or
closure," of British firms in China. China's reply was that the
firms' difficulties were "the bitter fruit of the policy of trade
control and embargo of the British Government." This alone, the
note continued, "sufficed to prove that by following the United
States in carrying out the trade control and embargo, the British
Government not only (had) contravened but also (had) jeopardized
the interests of the British people." 6
After the Korean War, when British trade controls could be
expected to cease, China apparently hoped for improved relations
with Britain and agreed to partially ease the terms of hostage
capitalism. Subsidiaries of some of the major British China firms
negotiated closure agreements. Yet China was still unhappy with
Britain's trade controls which were expected to be relaxed after
the Korean War. Later, in the cordial atmosphere between China
4. China Association Bulletin, No. 49, June 20, 1950, p. 1.
5. I have relied here on Evan Luard, Op. Cit., pp. 140, 155-175 and Robert
Boardman, Op. Cit., pp. 92-109.
6. See "Statement by the Chinese Vice-Minister for Froeign Mfairs, Mr.
Chang Han-fu, on British Trade with China," July 5, 1952, Op. Cit.
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and Britain several months after the Ko~rean Armistice at the
Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai and Anthony Eden discussed a
variety of outstanding problems in the relations between the two
countries.' As a result, Chou En-lai agreed that China would move
towards negotiating final closure agreements with British firms
still in China. Almost immediately, replacement visas were
granted more easily to British staff in China. Firms were allowed
to cut down staffs. And the discussions on closure between
Chinese officials and representatives of the various firms
proceeded more smoothly. After more than four years of hostage
capitalism Swires and Jardine Matheson, for example, ceased
operations and withdrew from China in summer, 1954. Other
firms withdrew as well.
Although an immediate benefit of the Geneva talks seems to
have, been easier withdrawal for some British firms, hostage
capitalism did not completely end with some of the larger firms'
withdrawal from China in 1954-55. Perhaps because of Britain's
tardiness, in China's view, in unilaterally taking action to relax
trade controls against China, the last British firm to leave China,
Patons and Baldwins, was not permitted to do so until 1957. It
was in 1957 that Britain moved away from the U.S. led embargo
of the China trade. Yet with or without improved Sino-British
relations, foreign firms could be expected to be absorbed in the
accelerated assimilation of private enterprise in China towards
the end of 1955.
China has said very little about its general policy of
nationalizing foreign firms or specifically about unhappiness of
the foreign firms subjected to the coercive nature of hostage
capitalism.
Whether any body of rules now exists setting limits to the
means that a government can use to obtain the investor's consent
to nationalization is a much debated issue. There appears to be
quite general agreement that some international restraint exists.
"Indeed, those states which take the circuitous route of expropriation by consent," writes a distinguished legal scholar, "appear to
do so either in recognition of the existence of an international
understanding or out of a practical desire not to advertise their
defiance of it." 8 China's leaders in this context need not have been
worried about the possibility of favorable intervention by the
British state. They no doubt did concern themselves, however,
7. See China Association, "Annual Report," 1957.
8. Detler F. Vagts, "Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements," in
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 195, No. 2, p. 126.

HosTAGE CAPITALISM

IN

PERSPECTIVE

67

with their policies' impact on the new government's international
credit rating and the possibility of adverse effects on international
economic institutions generally. To this day both Chinese officials
and representatives of British firms are reluctant to speak openly
about the difficulties of hostage capitalism.
Chinese officials have told this author that strictly speaking
nationalization never took place. 9 But they are simply being
disingenuous. Because China so completely controlled the busi·
ness environment of the various firms the People's Government
could confidently wait for the firms to request permission for
closure and the Chinese could in effect orchestrate that closure.
During hostage capitalism, year after year of poor business
conditions continued to absorb local funds and require reserves
from abroad to be brought in to meet overhead. Although the
terms of closure were unacceptable in the sense that British firms
were obliged to turn over their assets in exchange for mounting
liabilities, these terms of closure were inevitable as well. In this
situation, the firms were relieved to sign an agreement for closure
if only to stop being required to bring monies from abroad. China
gradually tightened regulations, increased taxes, and fixed lower
prices until diminishing profitability broke the foreign firms'
resistence to what for their boards of directors was a depressing
"no-win" situation. British businessmen were trapped and no
amount of business acumen could rescue them. Chinese government action had so distorted earnings that earnings as a partial
measure of the value of the various firms' assets became
completely artificial. A fortiori there was no set of competing
buyers for British, or other foreign firms, in China. Very
considerable, well-orchestrated non-market factors thus determined the legally questionable validity of the waiver of rights to
future claims fo!." compensation, which foreign managers were
forced to sign upon ceasing operations and withdrawing from
China. 10
9. Confidential Interview, Peking, March 15, 1973.
10. Another indirect, non-market, way in which foreign property, mainly land
and houses of private persons, was nationalized in China was by simple
abandonment by the owners. Property was treated as ownerless if it was not
registered with-the local land office. Ownerless land was taken over by the local
land administration bureau and the government reserved the right to expropriate
such land. At various times notifications were inserted in the Chinese press by the
authorities listing properties that would be treated as ownerless unless formal
claims were made, in which case taxes were usually owed. Evidently such notices
appeared only in Chinese newspapers, there are many in Jie fang jih-pao in the
early 1950's, the export of which was prohibited. In many cases the properties were
not identifiable because of changes in street names or street numbering.
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Beyond limited comments, China has .s.aid nothing about its
own nationalization program for foreign firms. Even in the
decrees which took control of U.S. assets in late 1950, China
avoided all references to "confiscation," "expropriation," or
"nationalization." 11 On two major occasions when China did
confiscate foreign property outright, the Chinese stated that these
actions were taken specifically in retaliation for British actions in
Hong Kong. 12 One case, in May, 1951, involved the requisitioning
of all installations of the Shell Oil Co. in China after the Hong
Kong Government took possession of an oil tanker of which the
ownership was in dispute in China. A second case involved a
judgment in July, 1952, by the Hong Kong Government that forty
aircraft standing in Hong Kong, tlie ownership of which had been
claimed by the People's Government, should be handed over to a
U.S. airline company. ·Following this action, the Chinese authorities requisitioned the British registered Shanghai Dockyards Ltd.
and Moliere Shipbuilding and Engineering Works.
In the only Chinese article on the general subject of
nationalization, Li Hao-p'ei noted in 1958 that nationalization of
private property for public purposes is recognized under international law as a proper exercise of a state's sovereignty. 13 In the
absence of specific requirements, Li also argued that the payment
of compensation is at the discretion of the nationalizing state, as
long as it does not discriminate in the application of its policy. 14
Few writers would disagree with Li that a state has the right to
nationalize as an exercise of its sovereignty. These writers would
question, however, if there are limits to the means employed to
exercise this right. How, for example, is consent to nationalization
11. For a useful discussion of this and other Chinese nationalization issues,
see James Chieh Hsiung, Law and Policy in Chin's Foreign Relations, A Study of
Attitudes and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 136-143.
12. An apparent exception was the February, 1953 requisitioning of the
Canton assets of Butterfield and Swire for which I have not been able to leam of
the specfic reason. See "Canton Military Control Committee Requisitions
Property of Butterfield and Swire," Nan-fang jih-pao (February 25, 1953) in SCMP,
No. 519:15 (February 25-26, 1953) and reprinted in Cohen and Chiu, Op. Cit., p.
700.
13. Li Hao-pe'i, "Nationalization and Intemational Law," Cheng-fa yen-chiu
(Studies of Politics and Law), No. 2:10-15 (1958), p. 204, reprinted in Jerome A.
Cohen and Hungdah Chiu (eds.), People's China and International Law, Op. Cit.,
pp. 718-729.
14. China did seem to adopt a discriminatory policy because while British (and
other Westem) concerns were being put out of business, joint enterprises were
operated under formal agreements with the Soviet Union.
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negotiated with the party being nationalized? The answer, as
many generations of legal scholars will attest, is unclear.
Relatedly, where standards for compensation are referred to
among writers on the subject, there is a great deal of variation,
ranging from those that permit the payment of little or no
compensation to those that require the payment of what may in
fact amount to full compensation. 15 As a result, when nationalization of foreign property is involved, it is seldom legal norms, but
instead the balance of international and internal power relations
that determine the ramifications of nationalization, with the
lawyers and legal scholars often serving as the instruments of
those interests involved. For China, in 1949 the balance tilted
heavily away from Britain and towards China, so that China
dictated even the terms of valuation.
China could not nationalize all of the foreign firms' assets,
many of which were in Hong Kong and London. This natural
restraint on the limits of nationalization, and the realism of both
China and the firms in understanding it, has served the various
parties well in developing a new relationship. Throughout the
years of hostage capitalism, the various firms' directors hoped
that their vast experience in China would allow the firms to
survive as importers-exporters in the China trade. Since 1954,
China in fact has employed the firms' power and influence abroad
as consultants in the interest of promoting Sino-Western trade.
From all indications the firms have profited handsomely as well,
especially in the contemporary post-Mao era when China's leaders
have engaged in a massive effort to increase purchases of foreign
technology.
15. For useful discussions of these issues see Richard Lillich (ed.), The
Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, Vol. I-III (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1972).
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